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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Explaining the gap and unpacking  
“political will” 
By unpacking “political will” into its main underlying constituent 
elements—power and interests—one can map the key actors 
involved in decisions around FPIC and prior consultation 
processes related to extractives projects, and better examine 
how the distribution of power and interests across them shape 
outcomes. This gives practitioners hoping to support these 
processes a clearer roadmap for addressing major roadblocks 
and opportunities to improve both the recognition of the right 
to give and withhold consent, and the process and outcomes of 
prior consultations.
Unpacking the political context and political will means focusing 
on the distribution and dynamics of power and interests that 
help shape whether the right to FPIC is recognized as well as the 
outcomes of prior consultation processes, by asking questions 
such as:
• Who are the key actors involved?
International recognition of indigenous and tribal peoples’ right 
to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a result of a hard-
fought struggle by indigenous rights movements that consider 
FPIC critical to facilitating the protection of indigenous rights and 
the expression of their autonomy, including in the context of oil, 
gas, and mining projects. In practice, while some progress has 
been made, the potential for FPIC as a right and a mechanism to 
facilitate and protect indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights is far 
from being realized in the countries studied for this report. 
Existing approaches of global actors seeking to support 
improved recognition of FPIC and implementation of prior 
consultation processes tend to focus on improving technical and 
normative conditions, i.e. the development of norms, standards, 
and guidelines and the capacity to implement these. One key 
piece of the puzzle that is widely recognized by actors working 
most closely with indigenous peoples, but less systematically 
integrated into how global actors support work on FPIC and prior 
consultation processes, relates to politics. FPIC is fundamentally 
about shifting power over certain decisions from one set of 
historically privileged actors to another set of actors, who have 
typically been marginalized; as such, it is unsurprising that 
attempts to implement the right would be highly politicized.
“One of the most important lessons to emerge among international development practitioners over the past two decades is that 
institutions (understood here as the formal and informal “rules of the game” that shape behavior in economic, social, and political 
life) matter for development, and that behind institutions lie politics  and power.”1 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine a specific subset of institutions—those related to the exercise of “free, prior and 
informed consent” and prior consultation processes in the extractive industries—and the politics and power that lie behind them, 
politics that often undermine the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights.
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• Who has power over what and whom?
• What are the interests and incentives driving the key 
players?
• How do all of these shape outcomes?
This report provides insights for global actors working to 
advance respect for FPIC to enable them to apply a more 
systematic political lens to their efforts. The report does this by 
1) analyzing some of the key political challenges faced in the 
context of FPIC and the implementation of prior consultation 
processes, by drawing on research from three countries in Latin 
America: Brazil, Colombia, and Peru; and 2) proposing a menu of 
different approaches for addressing these challenges.
 
Key actors interests and power  
Indigenous peoples and their allies
Interests. Although there is considerable variation across 
indigenous groups as to their interests in the outcomes of prior 
consultation processes, the interests of indigenous peoples and 
their allies in the recognition and operationalization of FPIC 
generally favor a process in which governments cede power to 
indigenous populations over key decisions related to extractives 
projects that would take place on indigenous lands and/or affect 
the rights of indigenous peoples. This includes ceding power 
to affected communities to freely decide, with the benefit of 
relevant information provided in an accessible format, whether 
and how the project will proceed well in advance of project 
approval. And, it includes recognizing the right of communities 
to modify consent to a project even once the project has begun.
Power. Indigenous peoples have historically had relatively 
little power in setting the rules of the game, i.e. in deciding 
how FPIC is operationalized, and how prior consultations take 
place. They have therefore had relatively fewer opportunities 
to shape relevant processes according to their interests. This is 
not to say that indigenous peoples and their allies have been 
entirely powerless. Indigenous peoples have expressed and 
wielded their power in multiple ways, including through protest 
and direct action, and by developing autonomous protocols 
seeking to re-shape the rules of engagement. In some cases, 
indigenous peoples have built power through collective action 
and by forming strategic alliances. In others, indigenous peoples 
have decided to opt out of prior consultation processes that fail 




Interests. Numerous government ministries and agencies are 
involved in the regulation of the extractives sector and in the 
implementation of prior consultations, with varying interests 
and incentives that drive their behavior. Ministries of economy 
and finance, investment promotion agencies, and  ministries 
of mines, energy, or petroleum typically prioritize attracting 
investment and tend to reject FPIC and favor the most watered-
down versions of prior consultation processes—those which 
create the least opportunity for indigenous populations to slow 
projects down or potentially stop them altogether. On the other 
hand, interior or cultural ministries, or ombudsmen, may have 
interests that at least partially align with some notion of a prior 
consultation process that involves meaningful participation of 
indigenous peoples in decision making. 
Power. Actors within government who have the most power 
over whether and how FPIC is recognized, as well as the most 
power over prior consultation processes, tend to be those with 
the greatest interest in a weak version of prior consultation. 
Proponent ministries tend to have more power and influence 
than other government actors over key decisions around FPIC 
and prior consultation processes. Actors within government 
who might support more robust versions of prior consultation 
processes tend to be those that are under-resourced and 
often side-lined in decision making processes. The power and 
influence of proponent ministries is wielded in multiple ways 
including by determining whether FPIC is recognized in the first 
place, by determining the procedural rules for prior consultation 
processes, and by shaping the discourse around FPIC and prior 
consultation processes, all of which tend to drive reality away 
from the original intentions that motivated the mobilization 
of indigenous rights movements to advocate for this decision-
making right.
Private sector actors
Interests. The interests of extractives companies with regard to 
FPIC and prior consultation processes vary across companies 
based on a number of factors including size, sector, country of 
origin, and reputation sensitivity. There is also variation within 
companies, with different actors having different preferences 
around FPIC and prior consultation processes. At a general 
level, though, extractives companies have an interest in projects 
proceeding smoothly, on budget, and with minimal delay 
or disruption.  These interests condition companies’ broad 
approaches to FPIC and prior consultation processes, leading 
them to favor prior consultation processes that do not risk the 
fate of the project by putting consent on the table. 
Executive summary
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Power. While the balance of power within companies is variable 
and dependent on particular personalities, and the outcomes 
of internal negotiations, social performance specialists, whose 
job is to establish and maintain good relations with host 
communities, tend to be the least powerful players within 
companies and tend to have to work harder to make their 
voices heard. The broad interests outlined above are reflective 
of the interests of project managers, operations teams, and 
company lawyers who look for certainty with regard to timing, 
costs, procedures, and legal compliance. Companies can wield 
significant power in service of these broad interests to influence 
government officials whose aim it is to attract and leverage 
companies’ financial and technical resources. In addition, the 
financial resources and benefits companies can make available 
to communities have been used to manage and pre-empt 
opposition. 
Looking ahead: politically informed 
approaches to FPIC and prior  
consultation processes
The first step toward integrating a political lens more 
systematically into work on prior consultation and consent 
is creating mechanisms for identifying, and ideally updating, 
relevant information on political context. This could be done 
by integrating political economy analyses into project planning 
and on-going oversight processes. The insights from these could 
then be systematically applied to the design, implementation, 
and periodic adjustment or adaptation of particular activities 
or interventions intended to improve practices around FPIC and 
prior consultation processes.
In order to address the misalignments of power and interests 
that can derail the realization of FPIC, as explored in this report, 
practical ideas for further discussion and consideration are 
offered that include: 
Strategies to change the status quo by 
changing the balance of power or  
changing the interest calculations of  
powerful actors
In order for the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples to be 
more fully realized and prior consultation practices improved: 
1) the interests of powerful actor(s) need to better align with 
the interests of indigenous peoples; and/or 2) there needs 
to be a change in the balance of power between the state, 
indigenous peoples, and companies. Strategies to change the 
balance of power between the state and indigenous peoples 
could include the building of strategic coalitions horizontally 
across indigenous peoples and indigenous organizations, and 
vertically with government allies and external actors including 
legal empowerment organizations and technical advisors. 
Further work on autonomous protocols to support communities 
in determining the rules of engagement is another key strategy 
identified. 
Strategies to navigate and work  
within the status quo
In particularly hostile political settings where the interests and 
power of the state and companies appear too ingrained, and the 
odds of success in the pursuit of the strategies outlined in the 
“Change” section above are low, one might consider strategies to 
navigate these realities as they are. Such an approach to “working 
with the grain,” proceeds from an acceptance of the political 
context as is and tries to identify strategies and approaches 
that can nimbly and opportunistically seize openings within the 
political landscape for advancing incremental progress toward 
the overall, long-term goal or build the necessary foundations 
for future reforms. This could include focusing on goals that 
prepare the groundwork for the achievement of longer term 
goals, for example focusing on disrupting the underlying drivers 
of socio-economic inequalities, discrimination, and securing 
territorial rights. 
Strategies to circumvent and work  
around the status quo
In settings where the government—the duty bearer for FPIC—is a 
significant obstacle, practitioners may seek alternative pathways 
to approximate the desired ends that indigenous peoples and 
their allies seek to achieve through FPIC and prior consultation 
processes. These could include, where appropriate, focusing 
on private sector-centric approaches, including engaging with 
investors as well as industry associations, to push for more 
robust standards and statements on company agency and 
obligations to respect indigenous communities’ giving and 
withholding of consent.
As the empirical analyses of this report detail, unlocking the 
potential of FPIC will necessarily involve grappling more 
effectively and systematically with the political circumstances 
in which these processes unfold. Those wishing to do so can 
draw inspiration and practical direction on politically-informed 
approaches from the initial thinking developed in this report, 
on which we hope to build more detail and cases of practical 
application moving forward.
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Implementation of indigenous peoples’ right to give or withhold 
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the context of oil, gas, 
and mining projects has been fraught. In principle, FPIC is meant 
to facilitate the participation of indigenous peoples in decisions 
that affect them and their lands, in recognition of their right to 
determine what happens to them and their lands, including 
in the context of large development projects. International 
recognition of this right is a result of a hard-fought struggle by 
indigenous rights movements that consider FPIC as critical to 
facilitating the realization of indigenous territorial, cultural, and 
self-governance rights.2 In practice, however, states have largely 
failed to operationalize the right to FPIC. Instead, many states, 
primarily in Latin America, have sought to facilitate a form of 
indigenous participation through the implementation of prior 
consultation processes that leave decision-making in the hands 
of the state. 
In the context of extractives projects that present high stakes for 
indigenous communities, but also extractives companies and 
the state, the ways in which these prior consultation processes 
have been carried out has been the subject of criticism and 
concern. Some indigenous representatives have described 
prior consultation processes as “a mere pretext for companies 
to access indigenous territories, who [in the end] will enter no 
matter what.”3 Scholars and practitioners have also argued 
that the ways in which prior consultations are implemented—
including how they are designed, who they include/exclude, 
their timing, where decision-making ultimately lies, and 
the monitoring and implementation of agreements—fail to 
meaningfully address the views and priorities of indigenous 
communities, and ultimately fail to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples.4
 This sort of implementation gap, which represents a significant 
deviation between the intentions that motivated international 
mobilization in support of international commitments on FPIC, 
and what happens in actual practice, is increasingly being 
recognized as an important quandary to confront in order to 
improve the impact of a range of governance reforms.5 Analyses 
of various forms of implementation gaps tend to attribute 
deviations to factors that are generally clustered around 
“ambiguity around best practice,” “capacity,” and “political will.” 
As much work is already being done on understanding and 
addressing the former two in the extractives sector, the current 
analysis takes up the last and attempts to bring more precision 
and clarity to the ways in which political realities shape whether 
and how FPIC is recognized and how prior consultations are 
implemented.
FPIC and Prior Consultation Processes
FPIC requires governments to cede power to indigenous 
and tribal peoples over key decisions that would affect 
their rights. Prior consultation processes, as implemented 
primarily in Latin America, are qualitatively different 
to what an FPIC process requires. At a basic level, they 
depart from FPIC principles by leaving decision making 
power in the hands of the state.
Indigenous movements, and other international and domestic 
actors and organizations, have been working to highlight the 
need for states to respect indigenous peoples’ rights to FPIC, 
Photo: “At home, Awas Tingni”
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often by deploying efforts to clarify norms and good practice, 
and by providing technical support to the key actors involved. 
This includes activities to promote, interpret, and litigate legal 
norms and standards, and advocacy aimed at advancing better 
practice. These activities are critical contributions to the broader 
struggle for the recognition of indigenous rights in the context of 
extractives projects. Much of the practitioner-oriented literature 
reflects this work and focuses on elaborating the meaning of 
FPIC and its relationship with the broader indigenous rights 
framework, analyzing legal and policy frameworks, developing 
guidance on good practice, and documenting deficiencies in the 
implementation of prior consultation processes.
This report seeks to complement these more normative and 
technical approaches by focusing on another crucial set of 
challenges that are critically important determinants: the 
political factors that impact how states recognize FPIC in 
practice, and how prior consultations are carried out in practice. 
There are many reasons why the right to give and withhold 
consent has not been widely operationalized, and the prevailing 
prior consultation processes have not in the vast majority of 
cases led to fuller realization of indigenous peoples’ rights. This 
report explores some of the key ways in which political realities 
contribute to this particular and extensive implementation gap 
by providing a richer understanding of the ways these factors, 
often labeled as “political will,” undermine the realization of 
FPIC and rights-respecting prior consultation processes in 
practice. All of this is done with an eye to providing practitioners 
working to support FPIC and prior consultation processes that 
better serve indigenous peoples with insights for applying a 
more systematic political lens to their work in order to improve 
their impact. 
 
To help better grapple with this set of issues, this paper will: 
1) explore a variety of ways in which the landscape of power 
and interests impact the right to FPIC, as well as how prior 
consultation processes unfold in practice; and 2) consider what 
this knowledge might mean for supporters and advocates 
hoping to see greater realization of indigenous rights through 
their work. In doing so, the intention is not to understate the 
importance of legal, technical, and practical impediments to 
FPIC and to better prior consultation processes, but rather to 
shine a focused light on political impediments. The latter, while 
often widely acknowledged and internalized by those working 
most closely with indigenous peoples, are less commonly 
scrutinized in practitioner-focused research and analysis, and 
are generally not systematically integrated into design and 
programming by global actors working on these issues.
 
This report is based on a desktop review of relevant literature 
and primary research consisting of over 50 confidential semi-
structured interviews with civil society representatives, current 
and former government officials, company representatives, and 
academics. In addition, throughout the report we incorporate 
findings from a convening of indigenous representatives and civil 
society actors held in April 2019 and organized in collaboration 
with Middlesex University School of Law. Due to more widespread 
ratification of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
169 (ILO 169) by Latin American countries, and the central role 
of the Inter-American human rights system in clarifying state 
obligations as they relate to FPIC, this report will focus on 
empirical examples from the region, drawing on in depth country 
analyses conducted by experts from Brazil, Colombia, and 
Peru to illustrate relevant examples. While this report includes 
findings from a convening of indigenous representatives, as 
well as findings from interviews with indigenous, quilombola, 
and other traditional peoples and communities that were 
particularly critical to the Brazil-focused research, this report 
does not purport to comprehensively represent the multitude of 
indigenous perspectives on FPIC or prior consultation processes; 
instead this report is designed to complement another project 
supported by the Ford Foundation that squarely focuses on 
understanding and capturing indigenous and tribal peoples’ 
perspectives on FPIC and prior consultations, by providing 
insights gathered from another important set of actors that 
impact on the right to FPIC, and who lead or are involved in prior 
consultation processes—government and private sector actors. 
The second part of the report introduces the underlying 
conceptual framework for identifying and analyzing “political 
factors,” while part three provides some background on how 
FPIC emerged and its intended functions in principle. Turning 
to how the right to FPIC and prior consultations have played 
out in practice, part four begins by considering the interests of 
key actors who are in some way involved in prior consultation 
processes related to extractives projects, and then moves on 
to an analysis of how power and interests converge to shape 
outcomes. Part five provides an overview of options for how 
donors and other global allies of indigenous peoples can 
operationalize more politically informed approaches to FPIC 
and prior consultation processes. 
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BEYOND POLITICAL WILL:  
EXPLAINING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY LENS
As noted above, much of the work of practitioners on FPIC and 
prior consultation processes to date has focused, on the one 
hand, on developing, critiquing and refining the terms and 
details of legal standards and frameworks and, on the other 
hand, on documenting deficiencies and advocating for better 
practice. These are enormously important factors contributing 
to everything from whether indigenous communities have good 
information and a clear understanding of the likely impacts of 
proposed extractives projects prior to prior consultations; to 
what the specific requirements should be regarding who should 
be consulted, when, and how; to whether and how outcomes 
should be implemented. It remains critical to try to get a 
handle on how to best align prior consultation processes with 
the capacity for effective implementation, and to continue to 
highlight the need for recognition of indigenous peoples’ right 
to FPIC. 
However, there is another crucial aspect of the story that is 
often well known by actors on the ground and studied by 
academics6 but less systematically addressed by global actors 
advocating for and supporting FPIC and prior consultation 
processes: the ways in which political economy realities shape 
all aspects of FPIC recognition, prior consultation processes, 
and their ultimate outcomes.7 Given that FPIC is fundamentally 
about shifting power over certain decisions from one set of 
historically privileged actors to another set of actors, who have 
typically been marginalized, it is unsurprising that attempts to 
implement the right would be highly politicized. The question 
is, how to understand the politics of FPIC and prior consultation 
processes, and apply that thinking to work meant to support 
these rights in practice?
While political factors are sometimes acknowledged through 
references to “political will,” the term is too vague, fixed, or 
exogenous to address in any meaningful way.8  However, 
by unpacking “political will” into its underlying constituent 
elements—power and interests—one can map the key actors 
involved in decisions around FPIC and prior consultation 
processes, and better examine how the distribution of 
power and interests across them shape implementation and 
outcomes. This gives practitioners hoping to support these 
processes a clearer roadmap for addressing major roadblocks 
and opportunities to improve both the recognition of the right 
to give and withhold consent, and the process and outcomes of 
prior consultations. 
“political economy realities shape 
all aspects of FPIC recognition, prior 
consultation processes, and their  
ultimate outcomes.”
The movement to bring more attention to political context 
has in recent years been buoyed by a group of development 
practitioners9 and “arose from the realization that highly 
technical (usually input-based) development programs often 
did not work very well. In particular, donors would rally around 
a reform process, providing technical advisers and funds, only 
to see the planned changes stall and disappear; this would 
usually be written off as a lack of “genuine political will.” Over 
time, development actors realized that understanding why the 
drive for change was missing (or where it might actually exist) 
required a better picture of what those with power wanted 
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(and did not want). It also meant finding out what factors 
make change possible.”10 Many of the basic insights from this 
work, particularly the recognition of the ways in which political 
realities can derail well-intentioned approaches to governance 
and development reforms, are more widely applicable. 
Beyond formal political processes and systems, deciphering 
political context means thinking more broadly about the 
following questions: 
• Who are the key actors that shape how the right to give and 
withhold consent is or is not recognized, and who are also 
involved in implementing prior consultation processes 
both in terms of de jure authority and de facto influence?  
• Who has formal or informal power over whom and over 
what realm of activity?  
• What are the interests or incentives driving their choices 
and behaviors, and how do these align with different 
interpretations of FPIC?  
• How do all of these factors shape the outcomes we care 
about? 
By embedding work in such understandings of particular 
political contexts, one can illuminate not what should happen 
in terms of norms and notions of best practices around FPIC and 
prior consultation processes, and what can happen in terms 
of capabilities of the actors involved, but what does and will 
happen when it comes to recognizing FPIC and applying and 
implementing prior consultation commitments in specific places 
at a given moment in time. Therefore, it is a critical element of the 
“three-legged stool” in the governance of extractive industries—
which rests on a combination of conducive normative, technical, 
and political conditions—that needs to be tackled in hopes of 
improving the effectiveness and impact moving forward. 
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FPIC IN PRINCIPLE IN  
THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
As is the case in the vast majority of countries in the world, in 
each of the countries studied for this research (Brazil, Colombia, 
and Peru) the state owns and manages subsurface minerals and 
petroleum on behalf of the nation.11 The state’s stewardship 
of sub surface resources operates in parallel, and at times in 
tension, with the land ownership and/or use rights that are 
held by communities, including indigenous peoples. Land 
rights are most obviously impacted by oil, gas, and mining 
projects on indigenous lands, but a number of other rights are 
also implicated, including the right to self-determination, self-
governance and autonomy rights, participatory rights, cultural 
rights, the right to life, the right to food, and the right to water 
among others. Importantly, there are constraints on how the 
state manages subsurface rights, constraints designed and 
intended to protect the fundamental rights of communities who 
stand to be impacted by extractives projects. In this regard the 
internationally recognized state obligation to obtain the free, 
prior and informed consent of indigenous and tribal peoples 
who stand to be affected by a proposed project is considered 
by many as a critical tool for indigenous peoples to protect 
a spectrum of indigenous rights, and counterbalance the 
overwhelming power of governments and companies in the 
context of extractives and other development projects.12 
In the context of oil, gas, and mining projects, free, prior and 
informed consent requires the state to consult with indigenous 
peoples, through their own representative institutions, in order 
to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of 
any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources.13 
The right is not exclusive to project-level activities, or even the 
extractives sector—the right is also applicable at the policy level 
where policies or laws that may impact on indigenous peoples 
are being considered.
The right to FPIC derives from indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination14 as well as a number of related rights including 
the right to take part in cultural life, and it is pursued as part of 
a broader context to realize indigenous territorial, cultural, and 
self-governance rights.15 ILO 169, adopted by the International 
Labor Organization in 1989, recognizes indigenous and tribal 
peoples’ social, economic, and cultural rights, including the 
right of indigenous peoples to decide on their own development 
priorities given the effect the decision has on their lives.16 ILO 
169 also emphasizes the state’s duty to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples, including by requiring the state to consult 
with indigenous peoples on relevant matters “with the objective 
of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”17 
ILO 169 is most widely ratified by Latin American countries,18 
with more than half of the state parties to the convention coming 
from the region. 
Following years of struggle by indigenous rights movements 
for more comprehensive international recognition of the 
rights of indigenous peoples, the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 2007.19 UNDRIP is recognized as the 
most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of 
indigenous peoples and recognizes the need for states to:
“consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their 
Photo: “Discussions over territory”
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free and informed consent prior to the approval of 
any project affecting their lands or territories and 
other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization, or exploitation of mineral, 
water, or other resources.”20
Much has been written on what it means to operationalize FPIC, 
and conduct prior consultation processes in accordance with 
indigenous communities’ interests in and rights to exercise their 
“autonomy, preside over their destinies, make decisions for 
themselves, and control their resources.”21 This includes:
• consulting with communities in culturally appropriate 
ways through community defined processes, and on issues 
that are jointly decided upon;  
• engaging with communities in an inclusive manner 
that creates opportunities for all people who stand to 
be affected by a proposed project, both directly and 
indirectly (recognizing that there may be different views 
and perspectives within communities), to participate 
in decision-making including through their chosen 
representatives or institutions; 
• consulting with communities before decisions have been 
made about a project so to allow meaningful participation 
in decision-making and influence over the process, and 
doing so over a period of time that is sufficient to allow 
communities to process and internally deliberate on 
information and make decisions collectively;  
• engaging with communities iteratively through the life-
cycle of a project so that it is an ongoing and dynamic 
process; 
• ensuring that communities have access to relevant 
information in accessible formats so that they are in a 
position to come to a fully informed decision; 
• and finally, the process should be oriented toward 
consensus building where the parties doing the consulting 
have a genuine willingness to hear and act upon the 
concerns and decisions of the community rather than 
a focus on extracting consent. There must be genuine 
opportunity for those being engaged to influence the 
outcome of the process. 
Yet, the ways in which the right to FPIC has and has not been 
recognized, and the ways in which prior consultation processes 
have been implemented in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, have 
diverged considerably from the international human rights law 
and principles on which they are based. 
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When it comes to putting FPIC and prior consultations into 
practice, multiple positions have proliferated over the years, 
influenced by the preferences of the actors who have the power 
and responsibility to respect and protect the right to FPIC. 
There has been much debate, for example, around whether and 
under what circumstances governments are obligated to honor 
indigenous peoples’ decisions-making authority, including 
decisions to withhold consent to a project, in fulfillment of the 
state’s duty to protect, respect, and fulfill human rights. Many 
governments and companies, concerned about what this 
could mean for their ability to develop extractives projects, 
prefer alternative models to FPIC—models that leave ultimate 
decision-making power in the hands of the government.22 
Multilateral institutions with financial interests in extractives 
projects have also favored this approach, developing standards 
and guidelines that more closely resemble a requirement to 
consult, with consent required only in certain circumstances.23 
In contrast, international and regional human rights mechanisms 
tasked with authoritatively interpreting human rights law 
have clarified that where proposed activities or projects may 
“substantially compromise or interfere”24 with indigenous 
rights, affected communities must have the opportunity to 
effectively participate in decision-making in relation to the 
proposed activities, “which requires not mere consultation but 
the free, prior and informed consent of the members of the 
community.”25 The jurisprudence of the Inter-American human 
rights system has been particularly instrumental in clarifying 
FPIC obligations.26
 
Key actors interests and power  
In order to understand how political context—again, the more 
specific and nuanced analysis of what is commonly referred 
to as political will—shapes how prior consultation processes 
unfold, the extent to which they are consistent with principles of 
FPIC, and who they benefit, one has to understand who the key 
players are in these processes, their formal and informal roles, 
what their respective interests and incentives are, and how 
their relative power does or does not allow them to influence 
outcomes. The key actors involved in prior consultation 
processes are grouped into three categories:
i) indigenous peoples and their allies, which may include 
indigenous organizations, legal and technical advisors, 
and international, national, and local NGOs, among others, 
depending on the particular consultation in question, 
ii) host government actors across a variety of levels and 
agencies, and 
iii) private sector actors working in and with mining and oil and 
gas companies. 
There are of course other layers of actors, including, for example, 
donors to indigenous groups and their allies and funders of 
extractives projects, but for the purposes of the current analysis 
the focus is on the interests and incentives of those most directly 
involved in project-level prior consultation processes. 
Photo: “Guardians of the Forest at Rise For Climate - GCAS - 2018”
from If Not Us Then Who?
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1. Indigenous peoples & their interests
FPIC is a decision-making right intended to advance indigenous 
rights to self-determination. In the context of extractive industries 
this theoretically requires governments to cede power to 
indigenous populations over key decisions related to extractives 
projects that would take place on indigenous lands and affect 
the rights of indigenous peoples. This includes ceding power 
to affected communities to freely decide, with the benefit of 
relevant information provided in an accessible format, whether 
and how the project will proceed well in advance of project 
approval. And it includes recognizing the right of communities 
to modify consent to a project even once the project has begun.
An indigenous leader from Brazil interviewed for this research 
described the interests of his people:
“Our main objective in [taking part in] a participatory 
free, prior and informed consultation and consent 
process is to increase [our] participation in decisions 
of great importance. … Through the decision-making 
process and veto power, we determine whether or not 
we want the project that affects an indigenous land, 
even with all the safeguards and mitigation measures 
that [the project] may have. So, it is clear that if after all 
the consultation process and the detailed explanation 
about a project… if the indigenous people think that 
decision will very negatively affect them, they do have 
the power to say “no, we do not want that for our 
people, for our territory.” Also, they have the right to say, 
“yes, we are in favor of this type of project…, and we 
want to participate and to build safeguards together.” 
[That] is not the same understanding of the Brazilian 
State or the private sector.”27
The interests of indigenous peoples in the operationalization of 
the right to FPIC are clear: to exercise influence over decision-
making in order to facilitate and safe-guard indigenous rights. 
The interests of indigenous peoples in the outcomes of 
project-level prior consultation processes (that do not, under 
national laws or regulations in the countries studied for this 
report, facilitate autonomous decision-making, but rather 
leave decision-making power in the hands of the state), can 
vary considerably depending on the priorities of the particular 
community. Interests can and do vary, and at times conflict, 
within communities. Divergences in interests may relate to 
internal power dynamics, including those that relate to gender, 
age, and other factors. In addition, interests may be conditioned 
by the context in which prior consultation processes occur, 
including existing social and environmental injustices and 
the very absence of a rights based framework that recognizes 
indigenous decision-making. Thus, the interests outlined below 
should be read with this in mind. They are illustrative rather than 
determinant or exhaustive, and may overlap or arise in sequence 
as prior consultation processes progress. 
Some indigenous peoples oppose extractive activities because 
of the potential for profound cultural, social, and environmental 
impacts, on the grounds that they threaten their cultural survival 
and other fundamental rights. Others may oppose extractive 
activities of large-scale companies to preserve community-
based extractive opportunities. The potential value of prior 
consultation processes to indigenous peoples in these situations 
is that they may provide opportunities to raise these concerns in 
ways that shape outcomes and prevent or modify the way that 
extractives projects proceed on their territories. 
For other indigenous peoples, prior consultation processes are 
understood as opportunities to engage with national-level state 
actors to seek redress for historical grievances and demand that 
the state fulfill its social obligations more broadly. These include 
grievances related to the lack of territorial titling, and systemic 
violations of the rights to health, education, and a healthy 
environment. For example, in discussing prior consultation in 
the context of an oil project in the Amazon basin, representatives 
from the Achuar, Kichwa, Kukama, and Quechua peoples who 
live in the vicinity of oil blocks 192 and 8 in Peru, expressed 
hope that the (then) upcoming consultation might provide 
an opportunity to compel the state to provide remedy for the 
decades of pollution, including heavy metal poisoning, that 
their communities have suffered as a result of oil extraction.28 
Similarly, the Mura people in Brazil have sought to raise the 
issues of territorial titling and the lack of critical social services 
in the context of a consultation concerning a potash mining 
project that would affect their territories.29
 
For others still, as anticipated by ILO 169,30 communities may 
seek to negotiate benefits for resources derived from indigenous 
lands and compensation for the negative impacts of extraction. 
For example, scholars have noted that Guaraní communities 
living in areas of hydrocarbon extraction in Bolivia have been 
particularly successful in negotiating for compensation even 
before promulgation of domestic regulation on consultation 
processes.31 The same is true of communities in Mexico, Peru,32 
and numerous other countries.33 The conditions under which 
benefits are negotiated will vary, but in countries where the 
state does not in practice recognize the rights of indigenous 
communities to give and withhold consent, and related rights to 
self-determined development, the absence of opportunities to 
pursue other developmental pathways may qualify the extent to 
which negotiations around benefit sharing may be considered 
free and fully informed.34 
For these latter two groups, their interests in the outcomes of 
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prior consultation processes lie in such processes serving less as 
a vehicle for opposing extractives projects altogether and more 
as an opportunity to improve how these projects impact their 
lives, and/or to serve as a bargaining space to demand that the 
state fulfill unmet social obligations.35 This could be for a variety 
of reasons ranging from the genuine belief in the potential 
benefits that a project may offer to merely being resigned to 
the fact that the project about which the community is being 
consulted will go ahead irrespective of their views. Cutting 
across all the indigenous perspectives above is a shared interest 
in prior consultation processes that create an opportunity to 
advance the rights of their respective peoples.
2. State actors & their interests
Governments generally play an outsized role in the extractives 
sector given their responsibility to steward the state’s sub-soil 
resources. The state also plays a central role in conducting 
consultation processes because of the state responsibility to 
respect and protect the rights of its people, including the right 
to FPIC and prior consultations. Various government ministries 
and agencies are involved in the regulation of the sector and in 
the implementation of consultations, with varying interests and 
incentives that drive their behavior. While governmental actors 
play a significant role all along the extractives value chain, 
including in the collection and management of revenues flowing 
from the sector, the promotion of extractives investments, 
award of contracts or licenses, and regulation and monitoring 
of operations stand out as critically relevant links of the value 
chain for FPIC and prior consultation processes. The following 
sections will be focused on government entities most relevant to 
the parts of the value chain noted above, and those most closely 
involved with prior consultation processes or promoting and 
protecting indigenous rights:36 
• Ministries of economy and finance and investment 
promotion agencies proactively seek out and set policy 
for management of foreign and domestic investment and 
related revenue. 
• Ministries of mines, energy or petroleum and related 
agencies formulate sector-wide policy, issue licenses, 
and in some cases also lead prior consultation processes 
with communities who stand to be affected by extractives 
projects. These entities are also referred to as project 
“proponents” throughout. 
• Interior or cultural ministries, or ombudsmen are tasked with 
a variety of roles including coordinating prior consultations, 
liaising with indigenous communities, and supporting 
indigenous rights, or human rights more broadly.
• The judiciary interprets the law when extractives-related 
disputes arise.
 The specific role of each of these will vary from one context 
to the next: their role may vary depending on the particular 
consultation in question, and much is dependent on the 
personal inclinations of influential individuals within these 
entities as well. It is nonetheless helpful to understand some of 
the mandates and general interests and incentives that typically 
seem to drive each of these key actors within government. This 
serves as a necessary precursor to understanding how these 
actors might view and seek to influence the recognition of FPIC 
and the implementation of prior consultations in specific ways.
Finance and investment promotion agencies
A ministry of finance’s primary interest in the extractives sector 
is to maximize the rents generated by the sector. The more 
money the government can generate from the sector, the more 
it can fund services and other government spending without 
borrowing. In countries with institutionally weak political 
parties, the large rents generated by the extractives sector are 
sometimes used by governing parties to make and sustain 
the political bargains with national and local elites that keep 
them in power,37 including through the funding of re-election 
campaigns.38 For these entities, therefore, the highest priorities 
are attracting and retaining as much investment as possible, 
which includes minimizing perceived obstacles to investment. 
When it comes to extractive investments, these entities consider 
the right to FPIC and prior consultation as potentially slowing 
or ultimately impeding the realization of extractive investment 
opportunities, except when prior consultations can be 
“wielded by governments as a counter-insurrectionary device 
to pacify opposition and legitimize controversial development 
projects.”39 As a result, this subset of government entities tend 
to reject FPIC and favor the most watered-down versions of prior 
consultation processes, those which create the least opportunity 
for indigenous populations to slow projects down or potentially 
stop them altogether, while simultaneously providing some sort 
of superficial release valve for diffusing tension and opposition 
by indigenous communities.40 This may be especially true in the 
context of oil and gas projects, which tend to generate larger 
financial flows on a project by project basis as compared to the 
mining sector. While ministries of finance and their supportive 
agencies do not typically play a formal role in prior consultation 
processes, it is important to consider their interests because 
these entities are often among the most influential over the 
executive and other key decision-makers within government, 
likely because of their critical role in the economy.
“Various government ministries and agencies 
are involved in the regulation of the sector and 
in the implementation of consultations, with 
varying interests and incentives that drive their 
behavior.”
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Entities charged with overseeing or  
regulating extractive industries
Extractives ministries, whether focused on mining, oil, or gas, 
tend to share similar interests with the finance and investment 
actors. Their goal is to attract and advance extractives projects 
as quickly as possible, which often means serving the interests 
of extractives companies. The research shows that these 
ministries have acted to reject the recognition of the right to 
give and withhold consent to extractives projects and limit 
prior consultation processes because both are perceived as 
“obstacles” to investment in the sector. For example, a former 
government official described a pro-company culture within the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines in Peru, explaining that the ministry 
often emphasizes promoting and supporting mining companies 
and investments at the expense of meaningfully regulating the 
sector.41 Thus, for these entities, the promotion and protection 
of the sector are much higher priorities than the promotion 
and protection of indigenous rights. There are mixed views 
within proponent ministries on whether it is even possible to 
reconcile the requirements of prior consultations with the goal 
of sustaining and increasing investment in the mining sector 
in Peru,42 with consultations being described by some within 
key ministries as an impediment to extractives projects and a 
“mechanism to halt projects.”43 Despite these mixed views, the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines is charged with coordinating and 
carrying out prior consultation processes in Peru. 
Unlike in Peru, the Ministry of Mines and Energy in Colombia 
does not lead the prior consultation process and, according to 
interviewees, has little if any formal involvement. But to the extent 
to which it has influence, its interests do not align well with FPIC 
or meaningful implementation of prior consultations grounded 
in a rights based framework.44 The ministry nevertheless 
has a strong interest in the outcomes of prior consultation 
processes because of its mandate to promote investment in 
the country’s oil, gas, and mining sectors. Given this mandate, 
the ministry’s incentives revolve around increasing the volume 
of extractives investment in Colombia. These incentives are 
further reinforced by the emphasis placed on the importance of 
the extractives sector by successive governments: despite the 
different political agendas of governing parties over the past 
ten years, each administration has viewed the extractives sector 
as critical to economic growth.45 One government interviewee 
explained that Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy has in 
recent years conducted minimal due diligence on the investors 
before granting mining licenses.46 This interviewee referred to 
the ministry’s actions in this regard as a “box ticking” exercise 
meant to reduce attempts at implementing relevant safeguards 
in service of significantly increasing the volume of investments 
in Colombia.47 A corollary of this is that, as one government 
respondent explained, the promotion of the sector has been 
viewed by some within the ministry as a higher priority than 
the state’s environmental and human rights obligations.48 
Indeed, prior consultations were previously considered by some 
in the ministry as an obstacle to extractives investment in the 
country, and, like in Peru, a government respondent described 
the requirement to consult as a “barrier” to the development 
of Colombia’s extractives sector.49 The same respondent 
attributed Colombia’s low scores on investment attractiveness 
indices to problems arising from the requirement to consult. 
Views have evolved over time, however, because of the 
increasing recognition among some within the ministry that the 
marginalization of communities can come at a greater cost than 
inclusion, negatively impacting the ministry’s ability to originate 
and sustain successful extractives projects. As a result, prior 
consultation is more recently being reframed within the ministry 
as a tool for benefit sharing to minimize opposition to extractives, 
although the idea of prior consent remains unpopular.50
In Brazil, the responsibility for the coordination of prior 
consultation processes within government is not clearly 
delineated. The proponent ministry, which in the case of 
extractives projects is the Ministry of Mines and Energy, may take 
part, and the Staff of the Presidency of the Republic may also 
play a role, along with the Ministry of Defense if the government 
considers there to be issues of national security at stake. These 
entities align in their interests: to promote investment in the 
extractive sector. Nevertheless, there are different views within 
these entities on the value of prior consultation processes and 
the role of consultations vis-à-vis the promotion of investment. 
Some oppose prior consultation outright. Others see the 
value in consultation processes as a way to demonstrate to 
companies the viability of land for their operations—to fast track 
a social license to operate.51 Either way—whether opposed to 
prior consultations outright or hoping to instrumentalize these 
processes in service of investment—none of these government 
actors consider implementing consultations from a rights 
based perspective. As a government representative explained, 
the vision and interests of those within government that seek 
to promote investment are fundamentally misaligned with the 
interests of indigenous peoples: not only do these entities view 
indigenous peoples as “obstacles” to investment, but some 
also misunderstand indigenous peoples’ distinct relationship 
with their territory. Because of this cultural chasm, these actors 
instead tend toward benefit sharing objectives and consider 
how to “include indigenous peoples in the market.”52
“This interviewee referred to the ministry’s 
actions . . . as a ‘box ticking’ exercise meant 
to reduce attempts at implementing relevant 
safeguards in order to increase the volume of 
investments in Colombia.”
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Government entities charged with  
indigenous affairs
Alongside the two preceding categories of actors within 
government that prioritize the advancement of extractive 
investments, there are another set of government entities that 
are relevant to the fate of prior consultation processes in the 
sector. While in all three focus countries the state bears the 
duty to protect and respect the right of indigenous peoples to 
FPIC and prior consultations, the specific entities charged with 
directly overseeing or defending indigenous peoples vary by 
country. These can include entities covering culture, the interior, 
and indigenous issues more generally. In general, the interests of 
these entities at least partially align with some notion of a prior 
consultation process that involves meaningful participation of 
indigenous peoples.
In Peru, the Vice Ministry of Intercultural Affairs (VMIA) is charged 
with “overseeing and defending indigenous rights across 
the public sector,”53 which includes sensitizing government 
agencies on the concept of interculturality, identifying 
indigenous populations, and developing guidelines for prior 
consultations.54 Though it does not lead in the implementation 
of prior consultation processes, in theory, within the Peruvian 
government, VMIA’s interests are most aligned with advancing 
an implementation of prior consultations that reflects the 
vision and interests of indigenous peoples. This was confirmed 
by government respondents, though indigenous respondents 
expressed doubts about whether VMIA could be considered 
a true ally, citing the lack of indigenous representation in the 
entity.55 Similarly, the interests of Peru’s Ombudsman Office, 
which is tasked with defending and promoting the rights of 
individuals and communities, also align with a rights based 
approach to prior consultations. However, while officials from 
the Ombudsman’s Office have acted as observers to prior 
consultation processes with the objective of recommending 
improved practices to other government entities, it does not 
have a formal role in implementing consultation processes.56
In Colombia, the Ministry of the Interior, rather than the 
proponent ministry, formally assumes a coordination function 
with respect to prior consultation processes.57 And while 
the degree of involvement by the Ministry of Interior may 
vary depending on the particular consultation, both private 
sector and government interviewees described the Ministry 
of the Interior’s role as “minimal” or “passive”58 and limited to 
determining which communities have the right to be consulted. 
One government interviewee described the ministry as being 
out of touch with the realities faced by indigenous communities, 
and even doubted whether many of those working on prior 
consultation in the ministry had ever visited a community.59 A 
former government representative described that the Ministry of 
the Interior—driven by the desire to avoid conflict with indigenous 
groups in the context of Colombia’s history of conflict—uses its 
influence to de-escalate the more hostile tendencies of other 
parts of government, including their preferences for militarized 
responses to quell extractives-related protest.60
The Colombian Ombudsman’s Office, which forms part of the 
Public Ministry, is another part of the state apparatus that can 
potentially impact prior consultation outcomes through its efforts 
to support indigenous communities.61 Its mandate is to promote 
the protection of human rights, and some within proponent 
ministries believe the Ombudsman’s Office to be biased in favor 
of communities.62 Given the office’s protective mandate, it was 
reported that communities usually request the participation 
of the Ombudsman’s Office to represent their interests in prior 
consultation processes.63 Similarly, communities sometimes 
request the involvement of the National Institute of History 
and Anthropology, which is considered by communities to play 
a neutral role in assessing the cultural impacts of extractives 
projects.64
In Brazil, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is the 
government entity charged with protecting indigenous rights, 
and the Palmares Cultural Foundation is the government entity 
charged with promoting and protecting the rights of quilombola 
communities. Both entities are responsible for mapping and 
demarcating indigenous and quilombola lands respectively, 
and in the context of large development projects, acting 
as a mediator among communities, companies, and other 
government entities. Both FUNAI and the Palmares Cultural 
Foundation have a role in the environmental licensing process 
and assess the environmental impacts of proposed projects on 
indigenous and quilombola lands—a process that often overlaps 
with prior consultation processes. As noted by the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, Vicky Tauli-
Corpuz, indigenous peoples in Brazil have, in the past, noted the 
“important role that FUNAI… play[s] in the protection of their 
rights. Governmental agencies and ministries also referred to 
their reliance on FUNAI to realize their own actions and programs 
for indigenous peoples.”65 But more recently FUNAI’s role and 
interest in protecting indigenous rights has been questioned. 
The reasons for this will be explored in following sections. 
The Federal Public Prosecutor’s office (MPF) in Brazil is a 
particularly powerful institution that serves as a check on 
the power of the executive, and that has been instrumental 
in developing legal norms on the rights of indigenous, 
quilombola, and traditional peoples and communities through 
the courts.66 MPF has been described by government and civil 
society respondents as “the leading player in defense of the 
right to consultation in the country.”67 Indeed, a government 
representative explained that when MPF brings a case against a 
government agency in defense of indigenous rights, it is a way of 
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reminding the state that there are public policies and laws that 
should be enforced and that the right to self-determination of 
indigenous and tribal peoples must be respected.68 
The judiciary
Colombia’s Constitutional Court, an important and powerful 
actor both nationally and regionally, has played an active role 
developing jurisprudence on FPIC and prior consultations, 
driven in part by the lack of national legislation on the topic.69 
The court has sought to constrain the actions of the executive 
through its judgements, and upheld the rights of indigenous 
peoples.70 Some within proponent ministries criticize the court 
for not adequately considering the perceived detrimental 
impacts of its judgments on the economy.71 The judiciary in 
Brazil and Peru has also played an important role in protecting 
the rights of indigenous (in the case of Peru), and indigenous, 
quilombola, and traditional peoples’ and communities’ (in the 
case of Brazil) to consultation.72
3. Private sector actors & their interests
Although there is considerable variation across extractives 
companies—based on size, sector (mining versus oil/gas), 
country of origin, reputation sensitivity, and other factors—
according to our research, some common trends in interests 
and incentives could be identified.
Interest in obtaining a social 
license to operate
The notion of a “social license to operate” (SLO) is distinct from 
the rights based framework in which FPIC is situated. Scholars 
have noted that the contemporary use of the term SLO first 
emerged in the mining sector,73 and is generally understood 
as the “broad, ongoing approval and acceptance of society for 
companies to conduct operations.”74 Achieving SLO has been 
characterized by companies’ “attempts to secure the acceptance 
of mining activities by local communities and stakeholders, 
in order to build public trust in their activities and prevent 
social conflict.”75 The financial incentives for achieving a social 
license, and the reputational risks of failing to do so, largely 
revolve around the costs incurred as a result of social conflict 
arising out of poor or unsuccessful community engagement, 
including lost production and impacts on publicly traded 
companies’ share prices.76 These same incentives apply to the 
oil and gas sector, particularly where operations are onshore 
or oil and gas infrastructure is likely to impact indigenous 
and other communities.77 A company representative from 
Mexico explained that in addition to financial incentives and 
reputational risks, companies are also motivated to achieve a 
social license to engender a sense of loyalty within the workforce 
where that workforce includes local community members: “The 
motivation for the company is to improve the quality of life of 
the people in the company: the people in the community are 
people who work for the company… people work better as a 
result, and express gratitude and loyalty to the company. …”78 
Company objectives in achieving SLO, therefore, are focused on 
establishing good relations and attaining the general approval 
of local communities in order to facilitate extractive activities. 
As such company incentives to invest in developing and 
maintaining SLO relate to risk mitigation.79 
Minimizing opposition and conflict around an extractives 
project and creating the conditions for a loyal and motivated 
workforce is, of course, not the same as recognizing the right 
of indigenous communities to autonomously consent to or 
withhold consent for projects that risk undermining their 
rights. So, while companies are increasingly recognizing the 
importance of SLO as it aligns with company incentives to 
operate projects unencumbered by community opposition, 
it does not necessarily result in increased recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and FPIC. And 
where the expression of these rights conflicts with a company’s 
interest in developing a project, companies may be reluctant to 
fully honor indigenous communities’ right to self-determination.
A company respondent confirmed that some companies view 
legally mandated prior consultation processes as separate to 
social engagement, while acknowledging that there is clear 
overlap. The interviewee explained that legally mandated prior 
consultations may form part of a broader social engagement 
strategy, often starting before formal consultations, and 
continuing afterwards. From this perspective, social engagement 
is considered to be a more fluid and dynamic process that 
creates internal “intelligence” for the company that aligns 
with the operations team’s core incentives to deliver a project 
on time and on budget.80 Where a company cannot achieve 
social acceptance, the significant financial and reputational 
consequences may render a project uneconomical, and in those 
cases some companies have tended to be wary of proceeding 
without a social license.81 It is in these situations that the 
objectives of FPIC and the concept of SLO are more aligned, 
but remain distinct: SLO is still predicated on building good 
relationships with the community so as to persuade them of the 
benefits of a project, rather than as a process through which 
indigenous peoples can more fully exercise their autonomy. 
FPIC and prior consultations, as they relate to a company’s broad 
profit incentive in pursuing projects, can be further examined 
through the perspectives of different types of company 
employees. Interviewees identified the following employee 
types as most relevant to project-level consultations:
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• Site level social performance experts tasked with liaising 
with local communities;
• Operations teams including managers, and technical and 
financial teams; and
• Lawyers that oversee legal compliance. 
What social performance specialists want
The interests of social specialists within extractives companies 
vary considerably depending on the individual and their 
professional background. One respondent explained that 
social specialists coming from a marketing or external affairs 
background will likely be driven by different motivations than 
those coming from a sociology or anthropology background.82 
Broadly speaking, though, the interests of social specialists 
center around establishing and maintaining good relations with 
host communities. What this requires in practice, and whether 
it falls closer to an interest in achieving and maintaining a 
social license as outlined above, or is grounded in FPIC and a 
rights based conception of prior consultations, will depend on 
the individual, and their ability to counterbalance the pressure 
of other parts of the team who prefer to keep consent off the 
table.83 
The operations team’s perspective
The operations team generally looks for certainty in the approach 
to FPIC and prior consultation processes with respect to the 
procedure to be followed, the cost, and the time consultations 
will take. A company respondent explained that it is much easier 
for social performance teams to generate internal buy-in where 
there are clear laws and procedures to follow, because in these 
contexts, operations teams view these processes as another 
step in the regulatory approval process.84 The same interviewee 
expressed that it is particularly challenging to convince the 
operations team—which is motivated to keep a project on 
time and on budget—that FPIC and prior consultation is not 
only important at the permitting stage as part of regulatory 
approval, but that it is also an active right, and one that requires 
an ongoing and iterative process throughout the project’s 
life-cycle. Similarly, it was explained that because companies 
respond to formal requirements and procedures, if the law 
requires companies to start a process before exploration begins, 
or to obtain the consent of indigenous communities (where 
companies are involved in the process), such practice is a more 
straight-forward “ask” of the operations team because the legal 
team will require the team on the ground to comply with the 
requirement. But where it is a principle of good practice to, for 
example, begin consultations early on in the project life-cycle, 
or to seek consent, rather than legally required by national laws 
and regulations or financing arrangements, it can be challenging 
to make the argument internally to go beyond that which is 
formally required.85  Interviewees did not explicitly mention 
the prospect of legal risks arising out failures to comply with 
international law as contributing to improved practices.
20  |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
IV.  Something different in practice
Project/general manager and technical  
team incentives
Respondents explained that the behavior of management 
is heavily influenced by reward schemes;86 managers’ 
remuneration packages are calibrated to incentivize managers 
to drive production and deliver projects on time and on budget 
in accordance with project plans. These high stakes personal 
interests create strong disincentives for managers to carve out 
an adequate amount of time to conduct prior consultation 
processes or to engage in consent processes. Because of these 
structural disincentives, one company respondent expressed 
the belief that managers who recognize the longer term value in 
investing time and energy in consultations are usually only those 
who have personally experienced the harmful consequences of 
failing to do so, including risks to their own jobs.87 Others have 
noted that technical teams have similar incentive structures: “the 
bonus structure of geologists depends on how many ounces of 
gold they find, not how well they maintain the social license.”88 
One company respondent acknowledged the misalignment 
between current incentive scheme structures and improved 
social performance, and suggested developing research to 
inform and support companies’ inclusion of key performance 
indicators linked to social performance.89 Indeed, others have 
found that there is a perception within companies that there are 
few personal incentives for getting social engagement right.90 
What the company lawyers want
Tasked with overseeing compliance with relevant laws, the legal 
team will want to demonstrate that the company has complied 
with its legal obligations in order to limit the company’s legal 
and financial risk.91 Interviewees explained that companies are 
often guided by their lawyers when it comes to FPIC and prior 
consultation processes. These lawyers tend to view consultation 
processes with a compliance mentality first and foremost, 
looking to domestic regulation (rather than international laws 
and standards, unless required by financing) to determine the 
nature of obligations and approach.92 One company respondent 
emphasized: “legislation dictates everything.”93 Another 
company representative explained that while community 
consultations should be more of an on-going and iterative 
process, a company’s legal team is more concerned with 
achieving a concrete outcome which brings some closure to the 
obligation.94 From the legal team’s perspective, this outcome 
ideally would be a written document signed by community 
representatives to demonstrate that consultation obligations 
have been adequately discharged and the process completed.95 
Company lawyers are therefore reluctant to commit to iterative 
prior consultation or FPIC processes (as distinct from ongoing 
social engagement) that leave open the possibility of project 
disruption at a later date, and open-ended legal and financial 
risk.
All companies are not created equal
At the corporate level, a company’s approach to FPIC and 
prior consultation processes and the incentives it responds 
to depend on the company’s personality and objectives. An 
interviewee explained that some companies have a much more 
global perspective and company culture which translates into a 
more diplomatic approach to how they do business. These tend 
to be the large multinationals, though there is variance within 
the category, depending on the company culture and even 
nationality.96 These companies tend to have greater capacity 
to develop corporate policies on FPIC and prior consultations 
than smaller companies and— particularly those that are 
publicly listed97—are more sensitive to reputational risks. As a 
result, these companies are more likely to be at the forefront 
of driving best practice, rather than focusing on doing the bare 
minimum. Companies that have shorter time horizons take a 
shorter term perspective to prior consultations or community 
engagement more generally, and an interviewee identified 
some junior extractive companies as falling in this category.98 
Other companies still, including smaller companies, may take 
a more “get it done” approach, not caring how or with whom 
consultations are done, as long as they are done. With these 
sorts of companies there is very little interest in best practice at 
the corporate level, which translates into poor practices at the 
project level. 
“Interviewees explained that companies are 
often guided by their lawyers when it comes to 
FPIC and prior consultation processes. These 
lawyers tend to view consultation processes with 
a compliance mentality first and foremost…”
There are variations between sectors, as well: business leaders 
from both the mining and oil and gas sectors have acknowledged 
that the mining companies have made more progress in 
integrating the concept of SLO (if not FPIC) into planning and 
operations in comparison to petroleum companies.99 One 
explanation for this could be that mining companies are more 
likely to have more direct and sustained engagement with local 
communities than counterparts in oil and gas, particularly 
where oil and gas activities are offshore and do not involve 
land-based infrastructure.100 This is because mining projects 
tend to have a larger land footprint than oil and gas projects, 
and because oil and gas projects tend to generate fewer jobs for 
local communities as compared to the mining sector. Structural 
differences between the sectors have also been identified as 
possible factors that account for differences in progress between 
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the sectors. For example, the fact that mining operations tend to 
be more locally focused and “nimble” as compared to oil and 
gas operations that operate in a more top-down manner may 
offer a partial explanation for the oil and gas sector’s slower pace 
in internalizing the concept of SLO and progress in recognizing 
indigenous rights more generally.101 
When companies want to be in charge
While the overarching incentives of both proponent ministries 
within government and companies with regard to FPIC and 
prior consultations broadly align, respondents described 
situations where there has been misalignment in approach, 
especially where there has been a history of conflict between 
specific communities and the government.102 In these situations, 
representatives from large companies have expressed a strong 
preference for retaining control of social engagement processes 
(as opposed to government led prior consultation processes 
that are considered part of the regulatory approval process) so 
the company is able to directly influence outcomes. 103 
How do power and interests  
converge to shape outcomes? 
In theory, FPIC is a right through which to recognize and 
operationalize the power of indigenous communities to 
make decisions on issues that impact their lands and their 
broader rights. In practice, power asymmetries across the 
actors discussed above have impacted how relevant laws 
and regulations are written, interpreted, and implemented, 
often in ways that dampen the realization of the interests of 
indigenous peoples inherent in the right.104 Whether the right 
to FPIC is recognized, and whether prior consultation processes 
in practice approximate the desired outcomes of indigenous 
peoples, is to a large extent a function of who has the formal 
authority and informal influence over how the rules are written 
and how the processes unfold, i.e. who has the power to shape 
these processes in ways that serve their interests. As suggested 
above and discussed in more detail below, the relative power 
of extractives companies and proponent ministries within 
government over indigenous groups and their allies both within 
and beyond government tends to result in failures to recognize 
indigenous rights to give and withhold consent, and prior 
consultation processes that do little to empower indigenous 
groups. 
Many extractives related prior consultation processes conducted 
by governments (and in the case of Colombia, companies), and 
the actual outcomes of consultation processes, substantially 
diverge from what is required by international human rights 
law and what is sought by indigenous communities. Indeed, 
not one example of a “successful” prior consultation process 
related to extractives could be identified by local experts across 
the three focus countries studied.105 The following section will 
explore some of the ways in which indigenous peoples exert or 
have built power in the context of prior consultation processes. 
It will also explore how the power of various government and 
private sector actors is deployed to shape the performance and 
ultimate impact of prior consultation processes, typically in 
ways that (at least superficially) serve the interests of these two 
sets of actors.106 
How indigenous groups 
influence implementation
Of the three main stakeholders, indigenous communities 
generally wield the least power in prior consultation processes, 
often lacking the political influence and financial and technical 
capacity to shape consultation processes in ways that advance 
their interests. Because indigenous groups have not generally 
been the designers or implementers of prior consultation 
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processes, there have been few pathways open to them 
to press for their interests. As a result, consultations have 
overwhelmingly been carried out in ways that are generally 
unsatisfying to indigenous peoples regardless of their specific 
interests. Indeed, as noted above, in the cases examined for this 
project, none of the researchers was able to identify a single 
prior consultation process related to extractives projects that 
was viewed as “successful,” i.e. capable of facilitating informed 
and autonomous decision-making. However, indigenous groups 
have not been completely powerless: they have been at the 
forefront of shaping norms, and have influenced consultation 
processes in multiple ways, some of which are explored below.
Power through protest
The use of informal power expressed through direct action by 
indigenous peoples has successfully changed the interests 
of powerful actors in some circumstances. The financial and 
reputational risks associated with protest, project stoppages, 
and conflict have pushed governments and companies toward 
increased engagement with indigenous communities and 
increased prioritization of establishing, at least, an SLO. Indeed 
community representatives reported that the threat of conflict 
is, at times, the only leverage communities have to generate 
government and company interest in engaging with community 
priorities, and company and government respondents report 
that the cost of conflict is a significant concern.107 Direct action 
by communities, however, puts the life and liberty of indigenous 
community members at risk when met with violence meant to 
deter and silence opposition.108
Power through collective action and 
strategic alliances
Aside from direct action as a source of power, there are important 
examples of cases where indigenous peoples have pursued 
collective action to increase their influence over consultation 
processes (see box 1 below). This sort of horizontal integration 
can be even more impactful when coupled with strategic vertical 
alliances.
Box 1: Coal exploitation in the Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta: Building coalitions among different indigenous 




The Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (the Sierra) is a mountain 
formation located in Northern Colombia, inhabited by four 
indigenous peoples: the Kogui, the Arhuaco, the Wiwa, and 
the Kankuamo peoples. The Línea Negra, a geographical 
delimitation that surrounds the Sierra contains several sacred 
sites of the four indigenous peoples: for them, the Sierra is 
central to their cultural integrity and the heart of the earth. 
 
In 2011 a precursor to a prior consultation process began 
between a Brazilian company, CCX (formerly known as MPX), 
which sought to begin a coal mining project, and the peoples 
of the Sierra. It was fraught from the outset.109 On the one 
hand, the project was of high interest to the company and the 
government. On the other hand, the peoples of the Sierra feared 
its implications for their spiritual, environmental, and cultural 
survival.110
 
A political body—the Consejo Territorial de Cabildos (CTC)—was 
founded to act as the representative organization of the four 
peoples of the Sierra before the state and other stakeholders. 
The objective of the CTC was to facilitate a unified approach on 
the basis that working together with shared criteria for action 
would be more effective to achieve their common goal to protect 
the Sierra and the survival of the peoples.111
 
The indigenous peoples benefited from the support of NGOs 
that provided specialized assistance and offered legal advice to 
the CTC.112 This support enabled the peoples to make informed 
decisions by reducing informational asymmetries. Although 
each indigenous group had its own advisers—including first-
generation indigenous lawyers who also served as “cultural 
translators”—and each group had its own internal discussions 
and disputes, the CTC was the formal representative of the four 
peoples throughout the process.113 
 
The premise of acting and deciding according to the Law of 
Origin, which is the “traditional ancestral science of wisdom and 
knowledge,”114 further unified the groups around the common 
goal of protecting the Sierra.115 This CTC mechanism facilitated 
robust internal communication, and allowed the peoples of the 
Sierra to coalesce around a shared understanding of their goals 
and preferences for the design of the process. The increase in 
unity brought about by the CTC mechanism, coupled with 
shared rules of procedure, allowed the peoples of the Sierra to 
speak with one voice in resisting external pressures, which were 
great considering that the project had the support of national 
and local authorities, and other communities including Afro-
Colombian communities and the Wayúu people.116
 
A civil society representative explained that coordinating and 
organizing in the context of the pre-consultation meant more 
than just getting on the same page; it also required there to be 
just one space of interaction with the state to pre-empt tactics 
of external actors to create division within the communities. In 
addition, this singular space facilitated record keeping so that 
commitments made during meetings were memorialized.117 
The peoples of the Sierra carefully documented meetings, 
and their alliances with external actors, including lawyers, 
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and international NGOs raised the profile and visibility of the 
consultation, and thus the reputational stakes for the company 
and the state of getting it wrong. The pre-consultation did not 
proceed to a formal consultation process in the end, and while 
the reasons for this remain unclear, some speculate that this 
was in part due to the fact that the consent of the peoples of 
the Sierra was not forthcoming, and in part due to the drop in 
coal prices.118 This process highlights the potential for power-
building when indigenous groups act as one coherent body with 
a common goal.119 The peoples of Sierra organized in politically 
savvy ways by building strong networks among themselves 
and with outside groups in advance of the pre-consultation 
process. They also increased visibility of the process both 
internationally and through local media to avoid the process 
being conducted in the shadows.120 While important lessons 
can be drawn from this particular case, the peoples of the 
Sierra still face pressures related to other mining activities.121 
Source: Paola Molana-Ayala, Politics of FPIC, Colombia country 
analysis
Box 2. Lessons from national-level prior  
consultation processes 
The importance of representation and the forging of strategic 
alliances with outside actors is also evidenced in the outcomes 
of national-level prior consultations with indigenous peoples 
on proposed policies and laws that affect them. While the 
confluence of interests and power that shape national-level 
prior consultations that are not directly related to extractive 
industries are distinct from the confluence of interests and power 
that affect extractives related prior consultations at the project 
level, interviewees from civil society and academia noted that 
in general, indigenous peoples tend to be more satisfied with 
the results of national-level prior consultations.122 At the project 
level, where prior consultations are more local in scope, less 
visible, and communities have fewer allies, technical advisors, 
and networks, power asymmetries between more powerful 
actors and indigenous communities are more pronounced.123
“At the national level, all of the organizations bring 
in their legal and technical advisors. Governments 
engage because they are ready to reach an agreement. 
There is greater transparency. Parties come to the table 
knowing the issues at stake, and the complexities are 
well understood beforehand. At the local level, you 
have a succession of surprises; everyday they learn 
something new about what is at stake.”124
Prior consultation on climate change regulation, Peru
Indigenous representatives and government representatives 
who were involved in prior consultations on the Regulation of 
the Law on Climate Change that took place in Lima and several 
regions of Peru in 2019 reported that most participants in the 
process generally agreed that it was a constructive experience. 
While the subject of this prior consultation could potentially 
be considered lower stakes in terms of the state’s economic 
interest as compared with extractives projects, it nevertheless 
provides some insights that could be useful to consider in the 
context of prior consultation processes related to extractive 
activities. Some key factors that contributed to its relative 
success as identified by individuals who participated in the prior 
consultation process include: 
• Sustained participation of the Vice-Ministry of Culture. 
Consistent participation of the Vice-Ministry played a 
critical role in tempering the power imbalances inherent 
in negotiations between indigenous peoples and 
organizations and the state—in this case the Ministry of 
Environment;
• The participation of national indigenous organizations 
allowed for more robust representation of indigenous 
perspectives as did the creation of exclusive spaces for the 
participation of indigenous women, who made up over 60% 
of the indigenous representatives who participated in the 
process.125 
• Donor funding for technical experts enabled more informed 
participation by indigenous representatives given the 
technical nature of the instruments being consulted on. 
Source: Roger Merino, Politics of FPIC, Peru country analysis 
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Power through protocols
Indigenous, quilombola, and traditional peoples and 
communities have sought to exert power in prior consultation 
processes by developing autonomous protocols that determine 
the rules of engagement between communities and third 
parties. These protocols reflect customary laws and practices 
and have been developed in response to poor regulation and 
implementation of FPIC and prior consultation processes.126 In 
Brazil, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s office working at the local 
level has provided technical support to communities in their 
elaborations of autonomous protocols, including the Munduruku 
Consultation Protocol127 and the Krenak consultation protocol.128 
And in some countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia129), state 
entities have legally or officially recognized certain peoples’ 
protocols, requiring or urging government entities to adhere 
to the autonomous protocols in consultation processes.130 
An indigenous leader from Brazil described the potential of 
autonomous protocols: 
“I think that the consultation protocol serves as an 
instrument to give strength… to say we have the right 
to be consulted in this way, in this timeframe… it is 
not you who decides who is coming to our villages. We 
decide. We are the ones who are able to say who can 
come, and who will not be able to come, as per the 
consultation protocol.”131 
As identified by indigenous and tribal groups, the power 
of protocols lies in building unity and strengthening self-
governance,132 and counterbalancing the power of the 
government (and where they are involved, companies) to 
determine the form and function of prior consultation and 
consent processes.
The power of non-participation
Despite the ways in which indigenous peoples have been able to 
achieve some success in shaping prior consultation processes 
and their outcomes, in general (as will be discussed in detail in 
the subsequent sections) these processes have tended to favor 
the interests of companies and governments at the expense of 
indigenous groups, and have failed to include the right to give 
and withhold consent. In the face of such prospects, some 
groups have decided their only hope of shaping outcomes is 
by withholding their participation. In doing so, they feel they 
can deprive governments and companies of the appearance 
of legitimacy. For example, the U’wa people of northeastern 
Colombia have a long history of mobilizing against oil extraction 
in their territory: “oil, for the U’wa indigenous people, is the blood 
of Mother Earth. It is vital for life. And if we extract this blood, the 
Earth will die.”133 Considering extractives projects as antithetical 
to their interests, and viewing the form of the prior consultation 
process implemented by the state as designed to undermine 
their interests and rights, the U’wa “rejected the concept of prior 
consultations altogether.”134 
How pro-investment government entities  
and companies shape implementation
The notion of “political will” often boils down to this: who has the 
power to shape outcomes and what do they want to do with this 
power. While the implicit focus of this concept is on government 
officials, the reality of who has power to shape outcomes is more 
complicated, because governments are not monolithic, nor are 
they the only powerful actors whose interests shape outcomes.
Where power lies within governments
Proponent ministries often play a prominent role, and have 
significant power, through legal authority and relative influence, 
to decide how to implement prior consultations. They can 
thus exercise their official authority and power to shape the 
implementation and outcomes of prior consultation processes 
in ways that advance their respective goals and priorities, which, 
as noted above, tend to deviate considerably from those of 
indigenous groups. This results in these ministries taking actions 
that expressly reject FPIC and circumscribe prior consultation 
processes. The more sympathetic government entities that are 
tasked with supporting the rights of indigenous peoples seem 
to be highly constrained in performing this role. These entities 
often lack sufficient resources or capacity to effectively execute 
their role in advancing the position of indigenous peoples. 
This relative deprivation is likely often a political calculation 
designed to limit the relevant entity’s power and influence. The 
result is that these under-resourced entities end up ultimately 
playing a lesser role in prior consultations. For instance, in 
Peru, despite having authority over indigenous affairs, VMIA’s 
power in prior consultation processes is limited. It is not only 
one of the most underfunded entities within government, and 
as such unable to participate more fully in consultations as an 
observer,135 but it does not enjoy the status of a full ministry and 
is therefore not on equal footing with the full ministries.136 With 
limited power and resources, and an inferior hierarchical status, 
VMIA is unable to compel proponent ministries that are driven 
by the belief that prior consultations will delay or obstruct their 
work to meaningfully implement consultations.137 Similarly, 
the role of Peru’s Ombudsman in prior consultation processes 
is limited, and its reports, that are meant to support improved 
consultation practices, have no binding force.138 
Similarly in Brazil, FUNAI, which has traditionally been viewed 
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as an ally of indigenous peoples, has more recently come 
under pressure from powerful politicians and other actors 
within government that are aligned with a pro-extractives and 
investment agenda.139 Back in 2016, the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous Peoples noted that indigenous peoples in Brazil 
were concerned that “the capacity and local presence of FUNAI 
were being debilitated to the point where the Foundation may 
soon no longer be able to fulfill its mandate.”140A government 
respondent noted that “the mediation that FUNAI used to do 
between indigenous peoples, companies, and even government 
interests has been stifled.” The respondent went on to explain 
that FUNAI’s reduced ability to fulfill its role is the result of 
“internal political persecution.”141 In addition, the reported 
reduction in FUNAI’s funding no doubt plays an important role 
in immobilizing the entity.142
In Colombia, despite bearing the responsibility for coordinating 
prior consultation processes, interviewees report that the 
Ministry of Interior is hardly involved, in large part because it 
lacks the funds and human resources to oversee the numerous 
consultation processes that take place all over the country.143 It 
therefore forfeits much of its role to the private sector. Because 
companies are typically responsible for funding, organizing, 
and conducting prior consultations, the real power to shape 
the processes lie in the hands of companies.144 An interviewee 
from the government emphasized that “everything—you 
must understand everything—is done by the private sector.”145 
Once the consultation is complete, the company need only 
present proof of consultation to the government, and if this is 
deemed sufficient, the process ends.146 And where companies 
experience delays or problems in consultation processes, 
government representatives reported that companies pressure 
the proponent ministry to intervene.147 As noted, in Colombia, 
proponent ministries do not have a formal role in the prior 
consultation process, but given their interests in facilitating 
investment, any influence that is in practice exerted will likely 
not align with the interests of indigenous peoples. 
Where power lies within companies
While it will differ from company to company and consultation 
to consultation, the interests of the operations team and legal 
team tend to most significantly affect how prior consultation 
processes play out in company led processes. This can result 
in a process that resembles more a compliance procedure than 
a genuine dialogue process.148 Of course social performance 
experts are central, but they tend to wield less power than their 
colleagues, which may be due to the fact that “financially… 
[they are] regarded within the corporation as cost centers rather 
than profit centers.”149 Their ability to call the shots in prior 
consultation processes is dependent on their ability to convince 
more powerful actors within companies of the value of FPIC and/
or prior consultation processes. One social performance expert 
noted that the hardest part of the job is internal negotiation 
rather than external interaction with communities: 
“we fight about these things internally. It is not easy at 
all. Now things are better because FPIC is part of the 
company’s procedures, but it is still not easy.”150
Even where companies do not lead the process, the private 
sector can still significantly impact the behavior of proponent 
ministries. For example, in Peru it has been reported that 
the private sector, and particularly mining companies, 
have significant power over the political system.151 A former 
government representative reported that Sociedad Nacional e 
Mineria Petrolio y Energy—an extractives industry association—
has “incredible influence” and access to the country’s leadership, 
and the Ministry of Energy and Mines in particular. The same 
respondent noted that close relationships between many 
industry actors and the policymakers who regulate the sector 
are a product of the groups mixing in the same elite circles.152 
Similarly, in Brazil, the government’s clear alignment with 
the agribusiness sector has the broader effect of influencing 
government action on indigenous, quilombola, and traditional 
peoples’ and communities’ rights more generally, which has a 
knock-on effect for realization of their rights in the context of the 
extractives sector.153 For example, the fact that the Parliamentary 
Front of Agriculture (FPA), a particularly strong agribusiness 
lobby group154 that aligns with the mining sector, opposes 
consultations and FPIC is likely to impact on the government’s 
stance on FPIC and prior consultations more broadly. 
In addition, government interviewees noted the impact of the 
“revolving door” between government and the private sector 
in many countries in the region. This was the case in the pre-
consultation process between CCX and the peoples of the 
Sierra in Northern Colombia, where the company employee 
who was tasked with leading the consultation process was 
formerly employed by the government; this type of situation 
was described by interviewees as a particularly common 
occurrence in Peru.155 The prevalence of former government 
officials going on to take up jobs in mining and petroleum 
companies further deepens companies’ networks within the 
government.156 With key government agencies thus captured by 
private sector interests,157 even where companies do not have a 
formal role in the prior consultation process, their interests are 
well represented.
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How power is deployed to set the rules of 
the game
“FPIC gets in the way of the government’s 
economic strategy–that is–indigenous peoples 
get in the way.” 
- Indigenous representative158
One of the most important ways that power and interests can 
be expressed in governance is by shaping the so-called “rules 
of the game,” i.e. determining how an issue is defined, how it 
will be addressed in practice, by whom, when, and the ultimate 
weight different voices will be given in determining ultimate 
outcomes. Almost across the board, governments dominate 
these policy-defining moments, unsurprisingly given that they 
touch on main functions of the state. Indeed, researchers have 
noted that participatory processes that are meant to deepen 
indigenous participation in shaping the rules that affect them 
and their lands may act as a means for the state to achieve its 
aims in defusing tensions related to extractive industries,159 
while at the same time reinforcing existing power dynamics by 
prescribing the form of participation in ways that contain and 
control participation and influence:160 “opening just enough 
political space to discourage frontal opposition, but too little to 
allow for substantive change from within.”161 This is a view that 
was shared by a community representative, who expressed that 
in practice prior consultation processes have created a vertical 
relationship between the state and communities that eliminates 
opportunities for the parties to engage as equals, with the state 
at the top, and communities at the bottom.162 
Setting the rules of the game – the how
The shaping of regulation by powerful actors has had the 
effect of prioritizing the interests of those powerful actors in 
determining the “how” of FPIC and community consultations. 
The circumstances surrounding the development of Peru’s prior 
consultation law is an example of how powerful actors shape 
laws to serve their interests.163 The process of developing the law, 
and in particular the accompanying regulation, was criticized by 
indigenous representatives as reinforcing power asymmetries 
between powerful state actors and indigenous groups involved 
in the process. The final law omitted the right to consent, 
and indigenous groups complained of imbalances between 
representation of the state and indigenous representatives on 
the commission to formulate the prior consultation regulation, 
as well as exclusion through other means including the type of 
language used during the process and the locations chosen to 
convene.164 This led to the adoption of implementing regulation 
that failed to address many of the issues that indigenous 
representatives viewed as fundamental to the protection of 
their rights.165 One specific critique of Peru’s prior consultation 
law raised by indigenous organizations is how much power it 
leaves in the hands of proponent ministries to determine the 
“how.”166 Instead of consultation processes being community-
driven and designed, as indigenous peoples and pro-indigenous 
activists have called for in line with the requirement to consult 
in accordance with indigenous peoples’ own processes and 
practices, consultations have been conducted in exclusionary 
and culturally inappropriate ways. 
In Colombia, multiple administrative regulations including 
Presidential Decrees establish the rules on the implementation 
of prior consultation that restrict the scope of the right. Experts, 
including the ILO supervisory bodies, consider that these 
regulations, none of which were drafted and promulgated in 
consultation with indigenous peoples, lack sufficient protection 
for the rights of indigenous peoples.167 Instead, they reflect the 
interests of the powerful actors behind their drafting. 
Perhaps the most stark manifestation of how the fact that the 
rules of the game are being shaped by powerful interests impacts 
outcomes is that in the countries studied, the right to FPIC—
the right to give and withhold consent—is left out of national 
laws and regulations.168 Indigenous representatives have 
described the participatory mechanisms that are reflected—
prior consultation processes—as an administrative process 
with a predetermined outcome.169 One community respondent 
expressed that the most problematic part of consultations is 
the part of the process where decisions are made, because the 
government controls how interests of indigenous peoples are 
taken into account, and ultimately it is the government that 
makes the final decision.170 Indeed, this outcome underlies the 
concerns of indigenous peoples in Mexico who consider any 
new general law on prior consultation would further facilitate 
the granting of concessions on their lands.171 And this reality 
is reflected in a new bill proposed by the Federal Government 
in Brazil that would open up indigenous, quilombola, and 
traditional peoples’ and communities’ lands to extractives 
activities and expressly exclude rights to give and withhold 
consent.172 
Like powerful actors within government, many companies do 
not commit to respect communities’ giving or withholding of 
consent. This is driven by some companies’ concerns that the 
standard of consent may potentially impair their ability to begin 
or continue extractive activities. One company interviewee 
acknowledged: “Most people are doing FPIConsultation not 
FPIConsent. I think that that is kind of the unspoken; that is 
ok if that is what makes it work.”173 Companies have pointed 
to domestic legislation and regulations to reinforce this 
approach,174 which some argue private sector actors have had a 
role in influencing.175
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This view is reflected in industry association statements and 
guidance documents. For example, the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association’s (IPIECA) 
guidance document on indigenous peoples and the oil and 
gas sector does not take an affirmative position in support of 
FPIC, but instead notes that many governments and companies 
prefer to engage in free, prior, and informed consultation 
processes.176 And while the International Council of Mining and 
Metals’ Indigenous peoples and Mining Position Statement 
acknowledges in its overview that the outcome of FPIC should be 
that indigenous peoples “can give or withhold their consent to a 
project,” it goes on to explain that because most countries do not 
have legislation that confers on indigenous peoples “the right to 
veto,” FPIC should be regarded as a “principle to be respected 
to the greatest degree possible in development planning and 
implementation.”177 And where consent is not forthcoming, and 
the relevant government decides that a project can proceed, 
ICMM’s position statement does not explicitly require members 
to respect the decision of indigenous communities in these 
circumstances, but rather defers to the discretion of ICMM 
members to “determine whether they ought to remain involved 
with a project.”178 This suggests that the outcome described in 
the overview (that indigenous peoples can “give or withhold 
their consent to a project”) is aspirational rather than required. 
In places where comprehensive laws do not exist, other actors 
have played a role in shaping standards. For example, in 
Guatemala179 and Colombia, where a general prior consultation 
law does not exist, the Constitutional Courts have found space 
to weigh in and interpret the law in this area. In Colombia the 
Court has concluded that none of the administrative regulations 
promulgated by the executive to regulate consultation 
comply with international human rights standards including 
standards in relation to FPIC.180 It seems that in the past 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court has interpreted international 
law largely free of the incentives that motivate actors within 
proponent ministries, and free of the influence of the private 
sector, which has resulted in interpretations that more fully 
recognize and protect indigenous rights in line with the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American system.181 In Brazil, where 
the legislative framework on prior consultation and consent 
is lacking, indigenous communities have sought to fill the gap 
by autonomously determining the rules for engagement as 
discussed in an earlier section.
Setting the rules of the game – the who 
ILO 169 establishes state obligations to consult with indigenous 
and tribal peoples.182 Domestically, this has been interpreted in 
various ways. In Peru, for example, the prior consultation law 
recognizes the right of consultation for indigenous peoples.183 
In Colombia, indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and Roma groups are 
recognized.184 And in Brazil, where no consultation legislation 
exists, experts have asserted that ILO 169 requires indigenous, 
quilombola, and other traditional peoples and communities 
to be consulted.185 While a single definition of “indigenous” or 
“tribal” does not exist, international law has recognized self-
identification as the pivotal criterion.186 
Driven by the motivation to limit the number of projects that 
require consultation, proponent ministries have actively tried to 
influence determinations of who is considered indigenous so as 
to narrow the groups who fall within the definition.187 A former 
government respondent explained that in the early days of the 
implementation of the prior consultation law in Peru, there was 
significant opposition from those within the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines during the government led process of determining 
which groups could be considered indigenous. Some argued 
that Peru did not have an indigenous population, preferring 
the view that “we are all mixed, we are all the same.”188 Others 
expressed the view that only those in the Amazonian regions 
could be considered indigenous because they have had less 
contact with “civilized” parts of the country.189 While it was VMIA’s 
proper role to advise on indigenous issues, and create a reference 
database of indigenous populations, the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines sought to exert its influence in ways that would restrict the 
application of the prior consultation law so as to limit the impact 
of the law on extractives projects. Because the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines was not bound by law to collaborate with VMIA, a 
former government interviewee explained that the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines took steps to make its own determinations, 
excluding certain groups from prior consultations because, in 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines’ estimations, they did not meet 
certain criteria.190 
In other instances, the Ministry of Energy and Mines would rely 
on VMIA’s database to reduce the number of communities to 
whom the requirement to consult would apply. For example, 
in the case of a copper mining project that would affect the 
Cañaris farming community (a subgroup of the Quechua 
people) in the central Andes, the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
pointed to the exclusion of this group from VMIA’s database as 
evidence that the requirement to consult did not apply, against 
the recommendation of the Ombudsman’s Office. Protest by 
the Cañaris people later resulted in the Quechua people being 
registered in the database.191 This exclusionary approach, which 
has been driven primarily by the preferences of the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines, was confirmed by community representatives 
who remain concerned about the state-centered approach 
to defining “indigenous.” For example, one indigenous 
representative noted that although the database created by VMIA 
has improved over time, it remains exclusionary, undermines 
indigenous identity, and restricts the application of the right to 
consultation.192
IV.  Something different in practice
In Brazil, there are multiple dimensions to actions taken by the 
state to deny indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination, 
including their rights to FPIC and consultations. Because the 
state officially recognizes indigenous peoples’ territorial rights 
through demarcation and titling,193 failure to demarcate and 
title indigenous lands by the government has been one method 
to i) legitimize mining operations on indigenous lands (which is 
prohibited by the Constitution in the absence of approval from 
Congress, which, at the date of writing, has not been given) that 
are yet to be demarcated and titled; and ii) deny the existence 
of indigenous communities’ legitimate territorial rights, and 
thus limit those communities’ rights to prior consultation. For 
example, in a case concerning a potash mining project that 
would take place on the land of the Mura people, the mining 
company, Potássio do Brasil, argued that because the land was 
not demarcated, it could not properly be considered indigenous 
land, and thus consultation was unnecessary.194
In 2019, in a move that would potentially further restrict the 
ability of indigenous groups to claim the right to consultation 
and consent in Brazil, the government transferred the job of 
demarcating indigenous lands to the Ministry of Agriculture. This 
change in control was called for by Brazil’s farm lobby, Sistema 
CNA, which interviewees described as one of the leading 
opponents to FPIC and consultation in Brazil.195 Though the job 
of mapping indigenous lands has since been transferred back 
to FUNAI following protest by indigenous organizations, Brazil’s 
current president has continuously affirmed that his government 
will not demarcate any indigenous or quilombola land,196 while 
also threatening to open up indigenous lands to mining.197 
Setting the rules of the game – the what, the when (and 
the how long)
One of the key elements of FPIC and prior consultations is the 
requirement that consultations take place sufficiently prior to 
any state authorization of a project proposed on indigenous 
territories, and sufficiently prior to any commitment or 
activity by a company on indigenous territories.198 In practice, 
consultations often occur when key commitments to projects 
have already been made and financial costs have been incurred. 
In Peru, proponent ministries have the discretion to decide 
when in an investment process consultations will occur. In the 
context of the petroleum sector, the requirement to consult 
is engaged prior to the grant of a concession, so the topic of 
consultation—the what—is the decision to grant the concession. 
But in the mining sector the requirement to consult is engaged 
only after the decision to grant a concession has been taken.199 In 
Colombia, prior consultations typically occur after exploration, 
so the topic of consultation is exploitation; this sequencing has 
been described as a key driver of conflict between communities, 
companies, and the government.200 It further weakens the 
position of communities in consultations because by the end 
of exploration, both the company and the proponent ministry 
have an even greater financial interest in the project, and are 
therefore eager to “close a deal,” and to exert their power to 
do so.201 One former government representative explained that 
proponent ministries in Colombia have come under significant 
pressure from companies that, after exploration, have faced 
opposition in consultation processes. In these cases companies 
have called on proponent ministries to intervene in favor of the 
project or to reimburse the company for expenses incurred for 
exploration activities.202 
A government respondent explained that they believed it to 
be in the government’s and companies’ interests to initiate 
consultations after exploration because the time and financial 
investment involved in undertaking consultations is too 
significant to incur before knowing if commercially exploitable 
resources exist.203 Another government respondent concurred, 
and explained that companies benefit from making deals 
with communities during exploration or in the context of 
other processes that occur in advance of the official prior 
consultation process; this sequencing allows companies the 
time to engage with communities and agree on benefit sharing 
arrangements before the official consultation process, so that 
when communities later learn of the prior consultation process, 
they are either already heavily invested in the project, or have 
signed away much of their bargaining power.204 This was the 
case in the Aurora mining project in Peru where the company 
had begun engaging with the community in advance of the 
formal consultation process through the environmental impact 
assessment process, and secured the community’s approval for 
the start of operations in exchange for urgently needed benefits 
including jobs and support for agriculture.205 A government 
respondent confirmed that similar sequencing challenges arise 
in Mexico because conversations around compensation for land 
use occur in advance of consultations, resulting in key decisions 
being made before consultations have even begun.206 In multiple 
countries there have been discussions to move the consultation 
process earlier to occur before concessions are issued, but there 
has been strong push back by both the government and the 
private sector. In Peru, for example, mining associations argue 
that such a move will impact investment in the country—an 
argument that influential government actors are sensitive to.207
There has also been resistance to prior consultations in 
proponent ministries because of the time it takes to conduct 
meaningful consultation processes. While indigenous 
communities call for processes that allow for deeper 
participation by building in sufficient time and flexibility, 
including for intra-community deliberation, this is perceived to 
be at odds with the financial incentives of both the governments 
and companies.208 Governments’ concerns around the length 
of prior consultation processes are heightened where there are 
numerous consultations in the pipeline and little government 
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capacity to oversee them, and exacerbated when they come 
under significant pressure from the private sector, which may 
call on proponent ministries to intervene when the process 
stalls or stretches over a lengthy period of time that does not 
align with project timelines. As a result, powerful government 
actors and companies look for ways to simplify and accelerate 
prior consultations,209 including by creating administrative rules 
that limit the length of consultation processes.210
How power is deployed to weaken, deter, or 
demobilize actual or potential opposition
Powerful actors shape narratives that undermine support 
for indigenous peoples 
Public solidarity with indigenous rights, when present, has 
proved instrumental in increasing the power and influence of 
movements. Following the Bagua tragedy in Peru,211 for example, 
there was widespread support for protests and strikes called by 
indigenous groups, and as a result, indigenous organizations 
were able to build broader alliances with new actors including 
trade unions, political opposition, and international and national 
public interest organizations.212 This increased the influence and 
capacity of indigenous organizations to demand recognition of 
their rights, which later resulted in the promulgation of the prior 
consultation law. 
For investment-promoting government actors, such alliances 
are seen as contrary to their interests. In many instances, these 
actors have sought to undermine the ability of indigenous 
groups to mobilize a broader group of allies in support of their 
rights by strategically reshaping the discourse. By characterizing 
indigenous groups who oppose extractive activities on their 
territory as “anti-development,” “leftists,” or “Marxists,”213 
governments pit these groups against the general population 
that is presumably “for” development. Such narratives are 
propagated at the highest levels. For example, the former 
vice-president of Colombia has argued that communities seek 
to blackmail companies in their exercise of their right to prior 
consultation.214 And in Brazil, a Congressional Investigative 
Commission has openly encouraged the government to 
denounce ILO 169, and described the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a grave threat to Brazil’s 
sovereignty.215 This discourse is effective in isolating indigenous 
communities from potential allies that could translate into 
increased political influence and power.
The media plays a fundamental role in shaping the narrative 
around extractives and indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights, 
and in countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, the largest 
media groups tend to be closely linked to political elites. In 
Peru, the voices and views of those within the government 
seeking to promote investment in extractives are powerful in 
the conservative media.216 Such coverage strongly influences 
the national discourse on extractives and indigenous rights, 
pitting the rights of indigenous peoples against broader 
economic interests. While FPIC and prior consultations have 
been characterized as a barrier to economic development by 
powerful actors, one interviewee explained that resistance 
to FPIC and prior consultation is also an issue of cultural and 
structural racism driven by the belief that indigenous peoples 
“do not deserve to be heard or afforded special treatment.”217 
Interviewees reported that misinformation publicized by the 
media in Colombia has the effect of delegitimizing the actions 
and decisions of indigenous communities, and putting their 
rights at risk.218 Instead of reporting on the risks communities 
face and their related claims for improved quality of life, access to 
water and other basic goods, the media has at times supported 
the narrative of indigenous peoples as “anti-development,” 
characterizing community blockades or action as attempts 
to harm the country’s economy. As a result, indigenous 
communities are further isolated in their cause.219 Community 
respondents from Peru echoed this concern.220 
Divide and rule within communities 
“The state has many strategies to try and make 
us fight amongst ourselves, and with other 
communities.”
- Indigenous representative221 
Governments and companies can undermine the likelihood of 
indigenous peoples finding power in numbers, by using divisive 
tactics to fragment or exacerbate existing fragmentation of the 
interests of community members and peoples. Scholars and 
indigenous representatives have noted that these strategies are 
used as a governing technique by powerful actors to achieve their 
own ends by weakening the ability of indigenous communities to 
“defend their claims, to organize collective action, and ultimately 
to uphold their rights.”222 These strategies also aim to streamline 
prior consultation processes in service of the interests of powerful 
actors to expedite the development of extractives projects. 
Divisive strategies include negotiating with community leaders 
behind closed doors to the exclusion of the wider community, or 
seeking to circumvent formal prior consultation processes and 
engage in unofficial talks with influential community members, 
in advance of the formal process. Co-opting leaders or other 
influential community members with the strategic distribution 
of benefits or bribery in order to “reward pro extraction attitudes” 
as well as to penalize opposition is another divisive tactic that 
has reportedly been used.223 For example, Maya communities 
in Belize have argued that companies have given jobs and 
money to those who support their activities, while restricting 
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access to jobs to those who do not.224 And in Bolivia, scholars 
have found that in consultations with the Guarani people, 
proponent ministries and companies negotiated with individual 
leaders and created “arenas of exclusive participation,” instead 
of conducting consultations through the Guarani people’s 
traditionally inclusive assemblies.225 Similarly, in the context 
of consultations for a hydro-electric dam in Brazil, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reported that 
the Munduruku people in Brazil had been allegedly approached 
by a consulting firm employed by the consortium of companies 
who sought to build and operate the dam and offered 
compensation in order to “abandon their opposition to the 
project and debilitate indigenous collective decision-making 
in relation to the project.”226 Another similar strategy described 
by one government respondent is the use of covert intelligence 
gathering to understand a community’s views on a project in 
order to stymie movements to oppose projects from within.227
Companies may also seek to take a piecemeal strategy to prior 
consultations in order to build incremental support for the 
project in order to increase pressure on communities who are 
consulted further down the line.228 For example, in the case of the 
proposed CCX coal project in northern Colombia that involved 
a pre-consultation process with the Kogui, Arhuaco, Wiwa, and 
Kankuamo peoples, the company first secured the backing of 
local authorities of the relevant departments and municipalities 
to reinforce the national level support the project enjoyed, and 
obtained the support of communities who were more accepting 
of the project, before moving on to consult with the Kogui, 
Arhuaco, Wiwa, and Kankuamo peoples, who were opposed to 
the project. By building momentum in this way, the company 
sought to exert pressure on the remaining communities to 
acquiesce with the project’s plans.229 
Inducing cooperation with the promise of benefit sharing
Another way to demobilize the support for recognition of FPIC 
and effective implementation of consultations is by inducing 
cooperation with the promise of benefits to be distributed to 
the collective through the life-cycle of the project. As noted 
earlier in this report, where companies have had early access 
to communities through environmental impact assessment 
processes or otherwise, they have been able to negotiate 
benefit sharing arrangements in advance of formal consultation 
processes, which eliminates the concept of consultations 
occurring prior to important decision-making related to the 
project, and results in the community having effectively signed 
away much of their bargaining power before consultation 
processes even begin.230 A company respondent acknowledged 
that because extraction is generally inconsistent with the 
values of many indigenous communities, companies seek 
acceptance of a project through the negotiation of benefit-
sharing arrangements.231 This has proved, in some cases, to be a 
particularly successful way of inducing community acceptance 
of extractives projects due to the socio-economic vulnerability 
of indigenous communities. Indeed, a respondent explained 
that companies have previously taken the view that “we must 
pay for consent.”232 And while some companies attempt to keep 
the benefit sharing and prior consultation processes distinct, 
this is not always the case nor in the companies’ interests to do 
so.233
In some cases, the stark societal inequality that indigenous 
communities experience calls into question whether consent 
can in fact be considered to be freely given where, in the context 
of profound material deprivation, it is induced by the promise of 
development benefits that should otherwise be provided for by 
the state.234 Moreover, where the right to FPIC is not recognized 
and consent is off the table, and communities recognize or 
believe that a particular project is a fait accompli, communities 
may instead enter into agreements with companies that are 
considered by company and outside actors as means for 
cultivating (and evidencing) social acceptance of a project. 
Indigenous organizations and experts have pointed to examples 
of this in practice where First Nation communities in Canada 
entered into impact benefit agreements on the belief they 
could not object to the project.235 The Assembly of First Nations 
described such agreements as “a way to make the best of a bad 
situation by securing some benefit from an unwanted project 
that [indigenous communities] do not feel able to prevent.”236
Controlling the flow of information
 
One of the ways companies pursue social license for a project 
is through controlling information about a project. They do 
this by often presenting a one-sided and positive picture of the 
benefits associated with a project, with limited information on 
the anticipated negative impacts. For example, experts describe 
the inter-cultural dialogue phase of prior consultation processes 
in Peru as being used by government officials to persuade 
communities of the benefits of a project rather than presenting 
opportunities to discuss the risks and potential impacts too.237 
At times companies actively restrict access to information or 
present it in ways that are inaccessible to communities. This 
behavior is enabled by an absence of independently verifiable 
information on project impacts, a lack of demand and/or 
capacity to interpret scientific or technical information that 
is made available, and few pathways to accountability even if 
information is made available and is well-understood. Company 
respondents expressed that it is a difficult task to persuade 
their colleagues within the company to provide clear and full 
information to communities in an accessible format because 
it goes squarely against the company’s interest in generating 
community buy-in to a project where providing the full picture 
may risk the community rejecting a project.238
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WHAT CAN BE DONE DIFFERENTLY MOVING FORWARD? 
OPERATIONALIZING A POLITICALLY INFORMED APPROACH
The above analysis has drawn on illustrative examples and 
empirical evidence to demonstrate the importance of political 
factors in shaping the ways in which the right to give and withhold 
consent is recognized and prior consultation processes unfold. 
By identifying specific pathways and mechanisms through which 
aspects of political context have often impeded the realization 
of rights and the outcomes being sought by indigenous peoples 
and their allies through work on FPIC and prior consultation 
processes, the hope is to complement knowledge of some of 
the more technical and normative challenges that also have 
emerged and are actively being addressed by practitioners 
through technocratic and normative solutions. The question 
that remains is what does all this mean for actors—donors, 
development practitioners, INGOs and others—who seek to 
support indigenous peoples (working with their local allies/
advocates) in pursuing their right to meaningful participation in 
decisions that affect their lands and livelihoods, including those 
affected by extractives projects? How can these actors more 
squarely address the ways in which political realities shape the 
efficacy and impact of their work on the ground? 
There is no “silver bullet.” “Solutions” to political challenges are 
as numerous, varied, and context-specific as those challenges 
themselves, which some suggest is why practitioners have 
largely side-stepped the unpacking and addressing of political 
factors to date even while widely acknowledging the importance 
of “political will.” Nonetheless, there is an opportunity to do 
better. There are various principles and resources to enable 
different actors to integrate a more systematic political lens into 
their work, including their work in support of prior consultation 
and consent. What follows is an overview of some of the 
building blocks to more politically-informed approaches to 
supporting FPIC and prior consultation processes, including 
examples to help clarify how one might address in practice the 
sorts of political challenges and opportunities identified in the 
preceding section.
Mainstreaming tools and systems for 
analyzing political realities 
At a general level, approaches to working in more politically-
informed ways involve: a) understanding key elements of 
how political context can shape the design, implementation, 
and impact of particular activities or interventions, and b) 
devising plans to address these.239 The former tend to rely on 
integrating political economy analyses (PEAs) of some sort into 
project planning and on-going oversight processes in order to 
understand and anticipate how key dimensions of these specific 
contextual factors can shape the landscape of opportunities for 
and impediments to progress on various goals or in addressing 
specific problems.240 Thus, the first step toward integrating a 
political lens more systematically in work on prior consultation 
and consent is creating mechanisms for identifying, and ideally 
updating, relevant information on political context.
“the first step toward integrating a political 
lens more systematically in work on prior 
consultation and consent is creating  
mechanisms for identifying, and ideally 
updating, relevant information on political 
context.”
Photo: “Meeting to discuss mapping”
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The analyses in the preceding section illustrate some of the 
ways in which various elements of political context can impact 
implementation and outcomes at a general level across various 
settings. They also show that there can be important variation 
from one context—whether regional, national, or project-level—
to the next, as well as variation in political circumstances and 
dynamics over time. Capturing the key elements of political 
economy pertaining to a particular issue in a particular context 
can provide the basis for strategizing how to best position work 
in pursuit of both long-term impact and shorter-term gains. 
These insights can help illuminate the prospects for impact of 
specific “best practices,” laws, or policy commitments in a given 
context by identifying roadblocks and pathways to effective 
implementation and enforcement. 
PEAs can run the gamut from formal and systematic evaluations 
by trained political economists to more informal and light-
touch assessments undertaken by those who know the ins and 
outs of a specific industry or region or issue particularly well. 
They tend to start with a basic mapping of key stakeholders, 
their power/influence and interests with regard to the issue in 
question, and (mis)alignments of these with intended goals of 
those intervening in the space, all of which can then be used to 
understand allies and opponents to particular reforms. PEAs 
can also help anticipate moments of opportunity on the horizon 
(e.g., relevant policy debates, IFI negotiations, etc.), (mis)
alignments of interests across key actors and with other policy 
priorities, or any other political economy factors that might 
make for more or less auspicious circumstances for the pursuit 
of specific outcomes and goals. There are numerous resources 
outlining different approaches to producing and using PEA, 
depending on the needs and goals of the actor in question.241
Then what? Responding to  
political realities 
Just as there is not a single approach to doing PEA, there is no 
single prescription for what to do once the lay of the political 
land becomes clearer. There are a wide range of ways to “work 
politically,” i.e. to address political conditions, and no specific 
template for doing so. Again, this will depend a lot on the 
priorities and resources of a particular actor working in this 
space and can range from “evolutionary” (layering political 
considerations into existing approaches and programming) to 
more “revolutionary” in the below figure.242 
Therefore, the purpose here is to provide an overview of 
various types of approaches to responding to major political 
economy opportunities and obstacles in order to try to bring 
about greater progress towards indigenous peoples’ goals for 
consultation processes. When possible, we provide illustrative 
examples of how such approaches might be applied to some of 
the challenges and opportunities raised in section IV.
Options for confronting  
political roadblocks
In terms of approaches to responding to political roadblocks 
that often impede desired outcomes and impacts, it can be 
useful to consider how different approaches position themselves 
in response to the political landscape. The typology CCSI has 
developed for doing so is as follows:
Thinking and Working Politically Uptake Spectrum
Revolutionary uptake: 
wholesale shift away from 
traditional aid approaches
Evolutionary  uptake: 








Partner with politically 
influential, non-
traditional groups
Focus on issues where 
elite interests are 
aligned with reform
Alternative funding 
models that disrupt 
rent-seeking
PEA integrated into 
country strategy
Technical approaches 
informed by political 
awareness
TWP Uptake Spectrum (Parks 2014)
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1. Attempting to change the political status quo. These types 
of approaches, drawing on PEAs, actively seek to change 
some aspect of the political status quo in order to improve 
the prospects for progress toward desired outcomes. This 
may include, for instance, efforts to change specific (im)
balances of power or (mis)alignments of incentives in 
order to create more auspicious political circumstances for 
addressing a particular problem or advancing a particular 
goal. A risk inherent in this approach, particularly for 
outsiders, is unintended or unanticipated consequences 
from “meddling” in politics, particularly in support of one 
community or issue, or accusations of such meddling 
being used to delegitimize the agendas and groups being 
supported.
2. Navigating the political status quo. Sometimes described 
as “working with the grain,”243 this type of approach boils 
down to accepting the distribution of power and interests 
as they are for the short/medium term and trying to get 
the biggest “wins” possible within these constraints. PEAs 
serve as background contextual assessments to inform 
the strategy, targeting, and design of advocacy, technical 
interventions, and other activities meant to improve a 
particular area of governance but without prioritizing 
changing political conditions. Trying to make the most 
of what is available can translate into seeking out and 
working with those actors whose interests and power are 
best positioned to carry a particular agenda or incremental 
reform forward, acting opportunistically on any political 
openings that present themselves, or adjusting down 
short-term expectations when political circumstances are 
particularly inauspicious. 
3. Circumventing the political status quo. In addition to 
trying to live with or change the distribution of power and 
interests that comprise a problematic status quo, in some 
cases there may be an option to try to circumvent political 
roadblocks by seeking alternative pathways to approximate 
the desired outcomes. These are attempts to sidestep 
political obstacles by replicating governance outcomes 
(i.e. particular “public goods”) through non-traditional 
modalities.
Working politically on FPIC and prior 
consultation261 
Many of the factors discussed above that skew prior consultation 
processes away from the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights 
come down to power imbalances and interest misalignments 
between indigenous peoples and their allies on the one hand, 
and powerful governmental and corporate actors on the 
other. The latter public and private sector actors can use their 
influence, and the financial and political resources underlying 
this, to shape how processes unfold—the very rules of the game 
and surrounding conditions—all in ways that advance their 
interests. These political and economic elites can also influence 
the interests and power of indigenous peoples in ways that 
further undermine these groups’ position and potential gains. 
So, what can be done in light of such realities? 
Change: Trying to move power and interests  
to improve FPIC recognition and improve  
prior consultation processes
In order for the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples to be 
more fully realized and prior consultation practices improved: 1) 
the interests of powerful actor(s) need to better align with the 
interests of indigenous peoples; and/or 2) there needs to be a 
change in the balance of power between the state, indigenous 
peoples, and companies; one that reduces current extreme 
asymmetries and puts the different sides onto more equal 
footing. (While the categories of incentives and power are dealt 
with separately below, there is significant feedback and overlap 
between the two). What follows is a sample of preliminary 
ideas of possible ways to encourage such realignments of 
power and interests in order to improve the prospects of FPIC 
implementation and improved prior consultation processes. 
The potential value and viability of each idea will vary by setting 
and actor who might take it up, and some are already in use.
Changing the current balance of power
Support increased collective action to build strength in 
numbers: intra-community coalition-building 
Individuals and sub-groups within a group of people often 
have different priorities and perspectives. These differences 
can be legitimate or induced or exacerbated by outside forces. 
Where different indigenous communities have come together 
and are internally organized and unified around a common 
goal, they have generally fared better in influencing the process 
and outcomes of prior consultations, and/or secured more 
equitable terms upon which companies are permitted to 
operate in indigenous territories. Therefore, a renewed focus 
on channeling resources toward efforts to support indigenous 
communities in coordinating internally and bolstering internal 
governance could help amplify the influence of these actors. This 
would also hopefully be one way to counteract the advantages 
governments and companies seek when exercising their power 
through strategies to divide indigenous communities and 
thereby dilute their influence (discussed in section IV). This 
type of support would need to be carefully calibrated to avoid 
meddling with or entrenching intra-community power dynamics 
or fragmentation, which may be exacerbated by concentrating 
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resources in the hands of a few. It would likely also need to 
include a mediation function. Executing such a strategy would 
require a politically informed understanding of intra-community 
dynamics, buttressed by carefully considered transparency 
measures.
Support mechanisms for political representation to translate 
collective action into political impact 
Even when unified, the presence of strong and unified political 
representation can be decisive in determining influence and 
the extent to which indigenous participation will be effective 
in shaping prior consultation processes and advancing the 
outcomes indigenous peoples seek. Therefore, in order to help 
realize the benefits of coordination across indigenous groups 
discussed above, supporters could also support access to 
strong representation of, and coordination among, indigenous 
organizations. As noted in section IV, with the exception of some 
high profile cases, project-level consultations are generally less 
visible than consultations at the national level. Supporting 
the creation of national-level dialogue spaces that focus on 
extractives, where national-level indigenous organizations can 
directly engage with the executive on extractives-related matters, 
and which connect to and support project-level processes, 
may help to increase visibility that can translate into political 
impact. Political organization by indigenous peoples is not new, 
and national-level dialogue spaces are not unprecedented. 
Indigenous organizations at local, national, and regional levels 
exist, and the Mesa Permanente de Concertación con los Pueblos 
Indígenas in Colombia, is an example of where major national 
indigenous organizations have secured a space for high-level 
representation to directly engage with the central government 
on national laws. The emphasis here is on supporting unified 
political representation. Again, such an undertaking would raise 
its own political challenges. The desirability of such an approach 
would necessarily be context-specific, and depend on, among 
other things, power dynamics within and across indigenous 
organizations, and the level of unity or fragmentation in the 
agendas of indigenous organizations. 
Support the building of networks with allies to broaden reach 
and efficacy of the indigenous peoples’ mobilization: inter-
stakeholder coalition building 
Another way to bolster the power of indigenous peoples 
and their influence over prior consultation processes is by 
supporting their networking with external allies, including 
civil society organizations and legal and technical advisors 
at different levels. This includes strengthening links between 
national and regional organizations and local-level civil society 
organizations, as well as the communities they support. 
This would help overcome some of the informational and 
technical asymmetries that are exploited by more powerful 
actors to skew outcomes in their own favor, including efforts 
to withhold information on project impacts or to control the 
way information is presented on a project. In countries where a 
large number of consultation processes are ongoing at any one 
time, donors may consider facilitating broader networks that 
connect indigenous communities and organizations with legal 
empowerment organizations and other technical advisors, in 
support of project-level prior consultations. 
Focus on increased visibility and control over narratives 
One of the ways governments and companies shape 
conversations around FPIC and prior consultation processes 
is by controlling the narrative around specific consultations in 
ways that diminish public solidarity with and support for the 
rights of indigenous communities. One way to help counter this 
and to build wider support for the indigenous cause is through 
focus on supporting the creation of alliances with sympathetic 
media allies, and through the involvement of international 
allies in shaping and publicizing narratives around project-level 
consultations. At a macro level, this could include supporting 
the development of independent media in countries where 
the major media houses are captured by state interests, or 
engaging in more micro-level targeted efforts to train and 
update sympathetic media outlets or individual reporters on 
how to report on indigenous issues and prior consultation 
processes.244 Increasing the visibility of individual processes 
may raise the financial and reputational stakes for companies 
and governments (i.e. change their incentive calculations while 
hopefully increasing the power indigenous groups through more 
widespread support).
Once allies have been lined up to help craft and disseminate 
indigenous perspectives more effectively, one of their targets for 
these reframing efforts could be changing the anti-development 
narrative that surrounds FPIC and prior consultations more 
broadly and in ways that increase solidarity with and support 
for the cause of indigenous peoples. As discussed above, 
our research shows that messaging around the exercise of 
indigenous rights in the context of extractives projects is 
unhelpfully reductive, and often brands communities who 
oppose projects as “anti-development.” This narrative equates 
extractives with improved development outcomes, and 
characterizes the exercise of indigenous peoples’ autonomy as 
denying the broader citizenry opportunities for development. 
Support the building of indigenous power through strategic 
support to other actors who might have influence over prior 
consultation processes
Government entities with interests that broadly align with the 
interests of indigenous peoples are often sidelined in many 
consultation processes due to a combination of a lack of 
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resources, and/or a lack of formal or informal influence over 
consultation processes. Supporting these entities to increase 
their involvement in shaping consultation processes (and 
representation of indigenous peoples within these entities) is an 
important first step. This could include providing resources to 
support the increased involvement of independent observers, 
public advocates, and relevant ministries that are sympathetic to 
a rights based approach to consultations and consent. However, 
increasing the resources available to these entities will not 
necessarily translate into their increased influence. This is where 
PEAs could be commissioned to identify reformers within and 
outside of government (including in traditionally pro-extractives 
ministries) who may be able to use their positions to increase 
the influence of these entities, as well as their own influence 
in their realms of activity that impact on prior consultation 
processes and indigenous rights. Inspiration could be taken 
from the World Bank’s International Corruption Hunters Alliance, 
a global platform that supports anti-corruption reformers within 
governments and “offers members representing more than 100 
countries an opportunity to jointly analyze national and global 
developments and to exchange information critical to the 
success of their work.”245
Support indigenous peoples in their efforts to set the rules of the 
game 
This would mean supporting indigenous peoples to lead on 
different aspects of setting the rules and procedures for prior 
consultation and consent processes. Law-making is a political 
process, and many prior consultation laws and regulations 
from the Latin American region have ultimately reflected 
and furthered the interests of already-powerful actors. In this 
context, the development of autonomous protocols that reflect 
indigenous preferences as well as their customary rules and 
practices for consultation and consent processes (as discussed 
in section IV) show promise as a means for indigenous peoples 
to redefine the “rules of the game” to better align with their 
interests. Our research suggests that companies respond to 
regulation. Without it, the role of social performance experts 
within companies in justifying the implementation of iterative 
consultation and, importantly, consent processes, may be 
further complicated. Thus, in contexts where companies play 
a role in consultation and consent processes, one way to try 
to socialize compliance with autonomous protocols might be 
through advocating for this to be a requirement included in 
IFI and broader financing standards, to increase incentives for 
corporate compliance. Another way to advance this agenda 
might be to couple support for the creation of those protocols 
with support for politically informed advocacy to push for legal 
recognition of community protocols, making adherence to 
them a legal requirement. This is not unprecedented. There are 
examples of judicial recognition of protocols in Brazil;246 and, in 
Argentina, the National Ombudsman recognized the protocol of 
the communities of Salinas Grandes and Laguna de Guayatayoc 
in Northern Argentina.247 
Changing incentives
Even when power asymmetries are impervious to rebalancing, 
there may be opportunities to try to shift the interests and 
incentives that animate actors’ choices and behavior, at least to 
disincentivize particularly poor prior consultation practices.
Increasing disincentives through litigation 
Litigation, coupled with other advocacy and direct action 
strategies, has increased the financial and reputational costs 
of non-compliance with FPIC and consultation rights for 
governments and for companies.248 The appropriateness of a 
domestic litigation strategy depends on the particular country 
context. In countries where the judiciary operates relatively 
independently and free of political influence, litigation strategies 
have served to advance the development of legal norms. In other 
countries, where the executive undermines the judiciary, and/
or there is rampant corruption, domestic litigation strategies 
may be less appropriate. In these cases, turning to regional and 
international human rights mechanisms, creating alliances with 
litigators or NGOs in the home state of a particular company, 
or turning to international grievance mechanisms may be 
more strategic. Decisions of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights (IACtHR), for example, have had a profound impact on 
shaping and further elaborating the definition of FPIC. However, 
in a study on the impacts of indigenous land rights-related 
strategic litigation, experts found that even where judgments 
found in favor of indigenous communities, “implementation of 
judgements in favor of indigenous communities was uniformly 
poor.”249 This general sentiment was confirmed by an indigenous 
representative involved in an emblematic IACtHR case, where the 
judgment remains unimplemented.250 The failure to implement 
domestic or international judgments may be explained by the 
fact that the responsibility to implement lies with those that 
have little interest or incentive to do so. Further strategies that 
focus on litigation as a means to improve practice in specific 
prior consultation processes (as distinct to the strategic purpose 
of developing norms—which remains of profound importance in 
its own right) may consider coupling litigation efforts with well-
funded and politically informed implementation strategies; PEAs 
could support the identification of allies for implementation. 
Increasing disincentives through direct action 
This approach mobilizes people and attention—e.g., by using 
direct action, strategic framing, virtual mobilization over social 
media, and other techniques—against prior consultation 
processes and practices that undermine the interests of 
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indigenous peoples. This kind of pressure on governments 
and companies from below is intended to change incentives 
of those currently holding power, i.e. create disincentives for 
side-lining the interests of indigenous peoples. As noted in the 
preceding section on power, increasing the profile of indigenous 
issues, framing them in such a way to broaden sympathies, and 
helping catalyze strategic coalitions can enable more extensive 
political mobilization and impact by changing the (dis)incentive 
calculations of companies and government agencies who 
would oppose them. Direct action has its risks, and has resulted 
in violent and deadly confrontations.251 
Engaging directly with companies that respect human rights 
to call for a change to internal incentive schemes that better 
account for social performance 
This could be critical to better aligning internal incentives with 
the goal of improved social engagement and could have the 
knock-on effect of improving the quality of prior consultation 
processes in which companies play a prominent role. To 
implement such an approach, more research would need to be 
done to understand who the key actors are within companies 
who determine internal incentive schemes, the incentives they 
are most likely to respond to (e.g., shareholder pressure?), 
and how these would be secured (e.g., through shareholder 
advocacy?). While this approach may still fall short of facilitating 
the expression of indigenous autonomy (i.e. FPIC) when the 
determinations of indigenous communities are at odds with 
a company’s goals in developing a project, better alignment 
of internal incentives could go some way in improving how 
companies engage with indigenous communities from the 
outset, and through the life-cycle of the project. 
Navigate: Pragmatic opportunism in pursuit  
of progress wherever possible 
In particularly hostile political settings, which represent the 
most challenging circumstances—i.e. where the interests and 
power of the state and companies are too ingrained, and the 
odds of success in the pursuit of the strategies outlined in the 
“Change” section above are low—one might consider strategies 
to navigate these realities. This means thinking about how 
to identify and maximize plausible “wins” within these highly 
constrained scenarios which are seen as fairly fixed in the 
near term. The approaches that follow are illustrative and not 
necessarily recommended. 
Opting out when opting in might do more harm than good 
When the pro-investment parts of governments and extractives 
companies have so much influence over the implementation 
of prior consultation processes, fundamental reform of these 
processes in the short to medium term can seem insurmountable. 
Indeed, from this starting point, some indigenous groups have 
actually felt their best option would be to withdraw from prior 
consultation processes. Their rationale for doing so typically 
has been that they have more to lose by participating in sham 
consultations that legitimize extractives projects for governments 
and companies without providing indigenous peoples with any 
real opportunities to shape outcomes than they would by not 
participating at all. Believing there is no hope of improving the 
process by overcoming underlying power asymmetries that 
work against them, they walk away rather than being exploited 
for others’ interests.
Preparing the groundwork for a longer term fight and 
acting opportunistically on openings 
Accepting the status quo and “working with the grain” does 
not have to mean giving up on trying to support consultation 
processes that better reflect and advance the interests and 
priorities of indigenous peoples. Even when power and interest 
dynamics significantly stack the odds against improving 
recognition of FPIC or the performance of prior consultation 
processes for indigenous peoples in the short term, there are 
alternatives beyond inaction or fundamental compromise. 
However, these might entail lengthening timelines for improving 
outcomes and focusing on identifying small steps that can be 
taken opportunistically in the interim to incrementally build 
toward that greater goal down the line. This means keeping 
effective FPIC recognition and implementation as a long-term 
goal while turning more immediate attention to trying to identify 
small steps, whenever and however possible, that could build 
momentum in the right direction over time. These small steps 
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could target some of the structural factors that limit the power 
of indigenous and tribal communities more broadly. This may 
include working to disrupt underlying drivers of socio-economic 
inequality and discrimination. Another critical focus could be 
improving the recognition of the territorial rights of indigenous, 
quilombola, and traditional peoples and communities, which, 
as noted above with regard to Brazil, is effectively a prerequisite 
for consultation processes.
Seeking the lowest common denominator (meeting the 
powerful at their interests) 
Another approach to navigating highly challenging political 
realities, derived from a view of current political realities as fixed 
and hostile to indigenous people’s rights and goals, focuses 
on acquiescing to and capitalizing on the interests of powerful 
actors. Throughout the interviews and workshops carried out for 
this project, government and company representatives made it 
clear that as long as indigenous peoples pursue their right to 
consent (and therefore the right to withhold consent), powerful 
actors would seek to minimize the potential impact of prior 
consultation and consent processes on extractives activities. A 
representative from a prominent financial institution explained 
that their approach is to try to support prior consultation 
processes that “take consent off the table,” in the hopes that by 
doing so they can align these processes better with the interests 
of governments and companies in seeing extractives projects 
proceed unthreatened and then use the opportunity to push for 
more benefits from these projects to be passed on to indigenous 
populations. The rationale is, if companies and governments 
do not have to fear projects being thwarted altogether, they 
might be willing to support more meaningful “consultations” 
on mitigating harm or improving benefit sharing. It is a tradeoff 
between the pursuit of larger goals that are likely to be actively 
thwarted and lesser (incremental) goals that are more likely 
to yield at least some wins, which might be appealing to 
some indigenous communities. It is important to note that 
this approach is necessarily local in nature and—if desirable 
to an indigenous community—could be considered where 
communities do not oppose a particular extractives project on 
principle. 
To the extent that communities feel they have an interest in 
strategically using consultations as a way to address historical 
grievances with the state and/or to induce the provision of 
adequate compensation and benefits, donors may consider 
supporting them to negotiate equitable agreements, with a focus 
on implementation. The last point matters greatly because, 
oftentimes, agreements reached in the context of consultation 
processes are not honored by the state (or companies if relevant), 
and do not result in the resolution of historical grievances or 
the alleviation of structural inequities.252 Therefore, in addition 
to supporting the negotiation of better agreements, and 
advocating for the inclusion of critical enforcement mechanisms 
linked to the licensing process (e.g., stipulating at the licensing 
stage, that a material breach of the terms of a prior consultation 
or benefit sharing agreement amounts to a breach of the license 
terms),253 resources could be dedicated to a sustained focus on 
monitoring the implementation of these agreements. This could 
involve advocating for oversight by an impartial third party 
and/or drawing in more sympathetic parts of the government, 
including for example, the Ombudsman’s Office in Colombia 
and VMIA in Peru. Such entities would likely require increased 
funding to carry out these activities. Donors could also consider 
supporting community-based data collection and monitoring 
efforts to the extent that communities have an interest in this.254 
It is clear that efforts focused on benefit sharing alone will not 
support the central purpose of FPIC and may indeed undermine 
the exercise of the right at a later point in a project. They could, 
however, be paired with strategies to augment the power of 
indigenous communities explored in the “Change” section 
above, or, if pursued in the context of politically hostile settings, 
they could be pursued as interim measures in support of longer-
term goals. Indeed, scholars have cautioned against a focus on 
benefit sharing at the expense of sustained support for social 
movements and vice versa, because focusing on one without 
the other risks leaving indigenous groups with representation 
but “resource starved,” thus lacking any real power to influence; 
or, if resources are attained through projects delivered by 
companies or other development pathways, but indigenous 
peoples remain without sufficient representation, this will serve 
to “reinforce the symbolic order.”255 More generally, small-scale 
piecemeal projects are unlikely to respond to needs for well-
coordinated and sustainable local development. 
38  |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
V.  What can be done differently moving forward? Operationalizing a politically informed approach
Circumvent: Advancing FPIC and prior  
consultation outcomes and objectives  
through other means?
Perhaps the most significant departures from existing work 
in support of prior consultations and FPIC would come from 
thinking about alternative pathways to approximate the 
desired ends that indigenous peoples and their allies seek to 
achieve through consultation processes. Simply put, it means 
thinking about whether there are other ways—beyond the 
current models—of achieving the outcomes of: 1) facilitating 
the decision-making authority of indigenous peoples when their 
lands or livelihoods are implicated; and 2) if projects do proceed, 
minimizing such projects’ harm and ensuring that indigenous 
communities adequately benefit from them. 
Other roads to consent: improving private sector standards
Of the goals that indigenous peoples typically seek through 
consultation and consent processes, the opportunity to give or 
withhold consent is at once the most important to many and also 
the hardest to imagine advancing successfully through other 
means. Because formal authority over the disposition of subsoil 
minerals and the implementation of international commitments 
typically lies with sovereign states, the role of the national 
government in determining whether and how indigenous 
peoples will be recognized and whether and how they will have 
a voice in extractives-related decisions is not easily replicable 
through other pathways. Unlike development outcomes, e.g., 
creating jobs or providing healthcare, political recognition and 
authority cannot legitimately be conferred by the private sector 
or other actors outside the formal state. However, even when 
powerful actors within government oppose the right to give and 
withhold consent, companies have agency to decide whether 
or not to proceed with a project in the absence of consent. As 
noted in section IV, if unable to secure the social license for a 
project, some companies have been wary to proceed due to 
the financial and reputational risks. The agency of companies 
to decide is reflected in ICMM’s Indigenous Peoples and Mining 
Position Statement.256 However, in accordance with this report’s 
analysis, it is insufficient to rely on the good will of powerful 
actors involved in consultation and consent processes to align 
with the right to give and withhold consent in the absence of 
incentives to do so. A more robust ICMM Indigenous Peoples 
Mining Statement that sets the bar higher, bringing industry 
standards into alignment with the requirement to respect 
the decisions made by indigenous peoples in cases where 
consent is not forthcoming, in recognition of their right to FPIC, 
may provide a compelling incentive for companies to respect 
indigenous peoples’ right to give and withhold consent. Such a 
position statement could potentially be transformative. 
Other tools that may be considered as options to improve 
FPIC implementation and prior consultation processes include 
independently verified certification standards that create 
incentives for companies to ensure that government-led prior 
consultations align with international requirements, or, if 
companies lead the process, for their own processes to align 
with international standards. In order for standards like the 
Initiative for Responsible Mining Alliance (IRMA) to incentivize 
better practice, there would presumably need to be relatively 
widespread uptake at least among the more progressive 
extractives companies, and some kind of cost (reputational or 
otherwise) attached to non-participation. 
Finally, another strategy that has gained ground particularly with 
respect to human rights concerns and climate considerations 
is increased investor engagement. There are clear incentives 
for increased investor action: it is estimated, for example, 
that mobilization around the Dakota Access Pipeline cost 
the companies involved and their partners US$ 7.5 billion.257 
With these financial incentives for action there are potential 
opportunities to work with investors, using issue linkages that 
capitalize on and align with other investor interests and areas 
of recognized risk, to improve standards around respect for 
indigenous rights. 
Other roads to doing no harm and improved benefit
For those indigenous peoples who, in exercise of their right to 
self-determination, are willing to consent to extractives projects, 
FPIC might not be the only pathway to trying to minimize the 
harm of extractives projects. Indigenous peoples, wielding 
the threat of opposition or disruption, or increased power 
(through strategies discussed in the “Change” section, above) 
might circumvent their governments and negotiate with 
extractives companies and/or their investors directly. These 
direct negotiations might focus on developing meaningful steps 
by companies and investors to anticipate and reduce harm to 
indigenous peoples and their lands, and to improve the direct 
benefits to these groups, while advancing companies’ interests 
in securing social license. Again, there is precedent for this, 
e.g., building on the Devonshire Initiative’s Beyond Zero Harm 
Framework,258 currently being piloted in Ghana, Burkina Faso, 
and Guinea.259 In essence, this approach would be pursuing 
some of the same ends from the “Navigate” section but instead 
of focusing on the state as a key player in terms of the delivery 
of specific outcomes desired by indigenous peoples, the focus 
would be on private sector actors. The same provisos outlined 
at the end of the “Navigate” section apply here—and with even 
greater emphasis—because of the ways in which powerful 
actors, and in particular companies, have in the past used 
the promise of benefits in advance of or during consultation 
processes to induce the acquiescence of indigenous peoples in 
ways that erode their rights to self-determination. 
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Pathway 1: Changing the landscape of power and interests
Changing power
• Support increased collective action to build strength in numbers: intra-community coalition-
building. 
• Support mechanisms for political representation to translate collective action into political 
impact. 
• Support the building of networks with allies to broaden reach and efficacy of the indigenous 
peoples’ mobilization: inter-community coalition building. 
• Focus on increased visibility and control over narratives. 
• Support the building of indigenous power through strategic support to other actors who 
might have influence over prior consultation processes (e.g. sympathetic government actors 
within relevant agencies) 
• Support indigenous peoples in their efforts to set the rules of the game by developing 
autonomous protocols and advocating for official recognition of these. 
Changing incentives
• Increase disincentives through litigation. 
• Increase disincentives through direct action. 
• Engage with companies that respect human rights to call for a change to internal incentive 
schemes that better account for social performance. 
Pathway 2: Navigating Political Realities
• Opt out when opting in might do more harm than good. 
• Prepare the groundwork for a longer term fight. 
• Seek the lowest common denominator (meeting the powerful at their interests).  
Pathway 3: Circumventing Political Impediments by Leveraging the Private Sector
• Other roads to consent: improving private sector standards. 
• Other roads to doing no harm and improved benefit: directly negotiating with companies and 
their investors. 
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 Indigenous and tribal peoples’ right to free, prior and informed 
consent has transformative potential: potential to safeguard a 
variety of rights specific to indigenous and tribal peoples and 
potential to transform the power relations between peoples, 
governments, and extractives companies.  Yet, this potential is 
far from being realized in the countries studied for this report. 
This gap between intention and reality is no coincidence. 
The most powerful entities within governments, when it comes 
to the fate of these issues, are those with the mandates to attract 
and develop the extractives sectors. It is these entities that are 
calling the shots on whether and how the state recognizes FPIC. 
They, in turn, appear to be driven in part by what they perceive 
to be the interests and preferences of extractives investors 
(which in the extreme version can resemble a capture dynamic). 
Within extractives companies, the most influential actors seem 
to be those whose interests are not well-aligned with the spirit 
of FPIC, further stacking the odds against recognition and 
operationalization of FPIC. Fears of projects being delayed, costs 
increasing or deals collapsing generate disincentives, which are 
not adequately counterbalanced by incentives for compliance 
from legal requirements or perceived benefits. As a result, 
prior consultation processes are being implemented in place 
of recognizing FPIC and operationalizing FPIC processes. Even 
these prior consultation processes are carried out in ways that 
diminish the potential for meaningful indigenous participation 
in decision-making, clearly skewed toward advancing the 
interests of powerful actors in government and the private 
sector. To the extent to which there are some occasional benefits 
being realized by those being consulted, these consultations 
tend to typically reflect male perspectives and lead to gendered 
outcomes.260 Thus, multiple layers of political realities converge 
to significantly limit the breadth and depth of efforts to advance 
FPIC and prior consultation processes.
There is growing recognition in the broader development fields 
focusing on governance that politics matters. This report, and 
the project in which it is situated, was conceived to shed light 
on the ways that political realities impact the governance of 
extractive industries in order to offer practical insights, strategies, 
and tangible guidance for practitioners focused on addressing 
implementation gaps, which can be explained in no small part 
by political realities. This project highlights the importance 
of politics in the context of FPIC specifically, but some lessons 
drawn from the research are equally applicable to the field of 
extractives governance more broadly. 
Lessons for FPIC and prior  
consultation processes
Political economy analyses as a  
starting point
To embed work on FPIC implementation in the realities of local 
social, political, and economic contexts, a starting point would 
be to undertake some sort of assessment, in the case of our 
analysis, a political economy analysis of some sort. The purpose 
would be to develop a clearer roadmap for addressing major 
roadblocks and opportunities to improve both the recognition 
of the right to give and withhold consent, and the process and 
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outcomes of prior consultations. Because political context is 
fluid, assessments would need to be updated periodically, 
and strategies and windows of opportunity assessed in light of 
updates. Locally situated actors working to support improved 
FPIC implementation are embedded in the political contexts 
of their countries and regions, and may explicitly or implicitly 
carry out some version of a political economy analysis to inform 
their work. This may be done systematically, on an ad hoc basis, 
or intuitively. Local actors who do not already have systems 
for integrating such analyses into their work may benefit from 
developing internal processes to systematize the application 
of such analyses. Not every organization—local or global—will 
have the resources and capacity to generate in-depth political 
economy analyses on a periodic basis. In these situations, light-
touch political economy analyses, a facility for providing such 
analyses, or informal mechanisms to share knowledge and 
analyses between a trusted group of like-minded organizations 
and individuals may be options to consider and develop further. 
Acting on the findings of such an  
assessment 
Once the major incentives, interests, and power dynamics driving 
outcomes in a specific situation or context are well understood—
down to the interests and power of not only institutions but 
also key individuals—consideration would need to be given to 
the question of how to deal with these in order to maximize 
progress toward advancing meaningful recognition of FPIC and 
the implementation of prior consultation processes. Answers to 
this question would likely be multiple, varied, and multi-layered 
and usefully addressed by coalitions of coordinated actors. This 
report sets out a typology to organize strategies and approaches 
to address political realities, and invites practitioners to consider 
the questions: 
• What would it take to change the interests of powerful 
actors currently impeding the realization of the right to FPIC, 
or to change the balance of power?  Who is positioned to 
bring this about and what interest do they have in doing so? 
• What should be done if, in a particular context, the incentives 
and power dynamics opposing reform seem immovable at a 
particular moment? How might practitioners navigate such 
inauspicious political realities and try to opportunistically get 
the most out of a bad situation? Could this include adjusting 
timelines and focusing on incremental wins in the short-
term that could lay the groundwork for more transformative 
goals around improved recognition of indigenous rights in 
the longer-term, wins that may later create openings for 
and ultimately contribute “Change” strategies? Of course, 
in considering the implementation of these strategies, 
the political factors impacting each programmatic goal 
would need to be accounted for in the program’s design. 
• Are there alternative pathways to realizing the goals of FPIC? 
Is it possible to actively work around political roadblocks, i.e. 
try to achieve the same ends through alternative pathways 
relying on other powerful actors? In the case of extractives-
related prior consultation processes, could this mean trying 
to mobilize the power of companies and investors and, 
particularly in the case of the mining sector, their interest 
in SLO to achieve recognition of the right to FPIC when 
key government actors seem unlikely to be swayed? What 
would it take to bring this about?
Specific moments or political circumstances might call for 
different approaches and/or sequencing of interventions and 
strategies. Responding to these dynamic situations may well 
benefit from funding and programming models that are flexible 
and adaptive in approach and timeline, even while maintaining 
more fixed commitments to the short, medium and particularly 
long-term goals being pursued. By building processes and 
internal capacity to regularly conduct and respond to political 
circumstances and shifts on the ground, global and local actors 
will be better positioned to systematize the identification of 
potential windows of opportunity as well as obstacles to their 
work; to develop politically informed strategies for various 
political scenarios; and to seize opportunities to make shifts 
in programming that respond to or counter changing political 
contexts. 
Lessons for extractives governance 
more broadly
“Everyone knows politics matter” 
“Everyone knows politics matter” but few systematically 
integrate political insights into program and project design and 
planning. Local actors in particular are acutely aware of the ways 
in which political realities shape the prospects of success in a 
given reform area and can be quite savvy and opportunistic in 
navigating those political realities. However, this is not always 
the case with global actors who have traditionally approached 
governance and development reforms from more normative 
and technocratic approaches and top-down notions of good 
practice, along the way creating incentives for local actors to 
follow suit. Both global and local actors could benefit from 
integrating a political lens more firmly alongside or within their 
normative and technocratic approaches early on and factor 
political considerations into assessments of what might be 
considered “good practice” or a feasible pathway to reform in a 
specific context. Context-specific theories of change that factor 
in politics will likely yield more impactful programs and projects 
than those that do not.
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VI.  Conclusion
Global actors need to devote equal  
attention to form and function
One of the points highlighted by this research, but applicable 
far beyond this paper, is that good development practice 
and the promotion of good governance need to focus as 
much on planning for and supporting implementation as 
they do on identifying good practices and getting those 
formally adopted.  This starts with asking: what would it take 
for a particular reform or intervention to have its intended 
effect and what are the factors that determine this? While 
there is some effort to tackle these issues when it comes to 
addressing technical capacity to implement, more attention 
needs to be paid to addressing political conditions that will be 
needed to ensure reforms are operationalized more or less as 
intended. Such considerations would ideally be anticipated and 
integrated into program and project design from the early stages 
of any intervention in order to strategize the best approach for 
achieving a desired goal in a particular context.
We need a better understanding of how 
change happens 
So far, much work on good governance—of extractives and 
beyond—has focused on identifying laws, policies, and 
practices that should improve governance and development 
outcomes and on trying to get these adopted. But the significant 
implementation gaps that have emerged across a range of 
sectors and geographies suggest that expected changes are 
not following suit as hoped. Transparency is not automatically 
triggering accountability, technical assistance does not 
guarantee advice will be taken, putting a law on the books does 
not mean it will be put in practice and enforced. Therefore, more 
work needs to be done to understand what actually precipitates 
real change, e.g. when have governments or companies got 
the closest to implementing good FPIC practices and what 
precipitated that? Along the way, this would likely entail 
considering who would need to do what in order for a particular 
reform to truly take root and what would it take for them to not 
only be able to do this but want to do so.
As work on the governance of extractive industries and FPIC 
continues, there is an opportunity to learn from and build on 
the normative and technocratic strides that have been made 
to date and unlock more of their potential impact. Unpacking 
“political will” and more systematically operationalizing insights 
on political context will be crucial to that and within reach if we 
devote adequate attention to doing so.
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